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[923] 
The Myth of “Conquered Provinces”: 
Probing the Extent of the VRA’s 
Encroachment on State and Local Autonomy 
Michael Halberstam* 
This Article advances the controversial thesis that the preclearance provision under 
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) is not as intrusive as is generally assumed. It 
shows that the architecture of the preclearance regime is consistent with “new 
institutionalist” models of administration that favor devolution and learning through 
monitoring and disclosure. The Article thereby counters the unchallenged view—
articulated in Supreme Court jurisprudence, the legislative record, and scholarship—
that the U.S. Department of Justice’s authority to object to state and local election law 
changes under the preclearance regime has amounted to a heavy-handed intervention 
into state and local lawmaking processes. 
More immediately, the Article speaks to the Supreme Court’s likely reconsideration of 
the constitutionality of the VRA as no longer “congruent and proportional to an 
ongoing constitutional violation” under the standard advanced in City of Boerne v. 
Flores. It argues that the purported “federalism costs” of the preclearance regime 
should not weigh as heavily in the constitutional balance as many have suggested. 
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“[T]he design features of both legal and organizational rules have 
surprisingly powerful influences on people’s choices.”1 
Introduction 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 19652 (VRA) represents one 
of the most successful institutionalizations of civil rights. Section 5 has 
 
 1. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1159, 1161 (2003). 
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been a “major legal engine for transforming American democracy over 
the last forty years.”3 The VRA has brought about a revolution in 
minority voting rights4 and set the stage for the historic electoral success 
of Barack Obama.5 Indeed, “[t]he Voting Rights Act has been hailed as 
the most important piece of Federal legislation in our Nation’s history, 
not just the most important piece of civil rights legislation, but the most 
important piece of legislation ever passed.”6 
Prior to the passage of the VRA, African-Americans and other 
minorities were almost completely excluded from the political process 
throughout the South. Legal discrimination and outright fraud in voter 
registration, candidate slating, districting, and other voting practices and 
procedures kept minorities from registering, voting, and electing 
minority-preferred candidates. As late as 1967, fewer than 200 African-
Americans were elected to political office at any level in Alabama, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Virginia.7 In 1964, a single black was elected to a state legislature in all of 
the states originally targeted by the VRA.8 By 2000, that number had 
reached 231.9 The total number of black elected officials increased 
tenfold in Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas 
between 1970 and 2000.10 Many experts believe the VRA, and in 
 
 2. Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006)).  
 3. Pam Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 Election L.J. 21, 
21 (2004). 
 4. See, e.g., Nat’l Comm’n on the Voting Rights Act, Protecting Minority Voters: The 
Voting Rights Act at Work 1982–2005, at 37, 40–49 (2006); Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, 
The Voting Rights Act and the Second Reconstruction, in Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact 
of the Voting Rights Act 1965–1990, at 379, 381 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 
1994) [hereinafter Quiet Revolution]; James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Constitutional 
Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 893, 896 
(1997) (confirming that the Voting Rights Act is sometimes raised to the status of a “quasi-
constitution” and critically examining this view); Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1710, 1714 (2004) (arguing data shows that 
blacks are no longer “political outsiders in the covered jurisdictions”); Ellen Katz et al., Documenting 
Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. 
Mich. J.L. Reform 643, 644 (2006) (“The Voting Rights Act of 1965 . . . is one of the most remarkable 
and consequential pieces of congressional legislation ever enacted.”); Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the 
South? Regional Variation and Political Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in Voting Rights 
Act Reauthorization of 2006: Perspectives on Democracy, Participation, and Power 183, 187, 208 
(Ana Henderson ed., 2007) [hereinafter Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006]. 
 5. See Adam Liptak, Review of Voting Rights Act Presents a Test of History v. Progress, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 28, 2009, at A16. 
 6. Renewing the Temporary Provisions of the Voting Rights Act: An Introduction to the Evidence, 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 10 (2006) (statement of Wis. Sen. Russell 
D. Feingold). 
 7. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Political Participation 15 (1968). 
 8. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Reauthorization of the Temporary Provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act: An Examination of the Act’s Section 5 Preclearance Provision 38 tbl.4 (2006). 
 9. Id. 
 10. David A. Bositis, Joint Ctr. for Political & Econ. Studies, Black Elected Officials: A 
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particular, section 5, played a significant role in bringing about these 
dramatic changes.11 
Nonetheless, section 5 continues to be one of the most controversial 
enactments by Congress. Section 5 requires covered state and local 
jurisdictions to submit all new laws that affect elections to the federal 
government for approval before they can be enforced.12 Procedurally, it 
interjects the Department of Justice (DOJ) into state and local law-
making processes, by some accounts turning the passage of every 
election-related law into a “federal case.”13 Section 5 imposes an 
automatic sixty-day stay on the enforcement of any state and local 
election law in jurisdictions covered by the Act, during which time it 
grants the DOJ the authority to veto the new law unless and until the 
submitting jurisdiction has satisfied its burden of proving that the law will 
have neither a discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory effect.14 
As a result of this unusual institutional strategy, section 5 
preclearance has, almost universally, been regarded as a uniquely heavy-
handed federal intervention into state and local lawmaking. Justice Hugo 
Black’s dissent in South Carolina v. Katzenbach15 epitomizes the 
conventional view. With section 5, Justice Black wrote, “States cannot 
pass state laws or adopt state constitutional amendments without first 
being compelled to beg federal authorities to approve their 
policies, . . . [which amounts to treating them as] little more than 
conquered provinces.”16 This charge has echoed throughout section 5 
jurisprudence, most recently in a constitutional challenge in Northwest 
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder 
(“NAMUDNO”).17 Having filed their complaint within days of the 2006 
Reauthorization of the VRA,18 the petitioners described section 5 as “the 
most federally invasive law in existence,”19 and argued that, in light of the 
 
Statistical Summary app. at 28 (2000). 
 11. See, e.g., Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1249, 1250–52 (1989). 
 12. “Coverage” extends to all or part of sixteen states: all of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas; most of Virginia; four counties in California; five 
counties in Florida; two townships in Michigan; ten towns in New Hampshire; three counties in New 
York; forty counties in North Carolina; and two counties in South Dakota. See Jurisdictions Covered 
Under Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, as Amended, 28 C.F.R. § 51 app. (2010). 
 13. Personal Communication with Richard Bourne, Professor of Law, Univ. of Baltimore Sch. of 
Law (Nov. 2008). Mr. Bourne was a staff attorney with the DOJ Civil Rights Division just after the 
passage of the VRA in 1965. Id. 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2006). 
 15. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).  
 16. Id. at 358–60 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 17. 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512 (2009). 
 18. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization 
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973 to 1973aa-1 (2006)). 
 19. Jurisdictional Statement at 2, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322), 2008 WL 4181890. 
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dramatic improvements in vote discrimination since the VRA was passed 
in 1965, Congress’s 2006 reauthorization of section 5 preclearance no 
longer represented a “congruent and proportional” remedy for persisting 
constitutional violations.20 The Court ultimately decided the matter on 
alternate grounds: It expressly avoided addressing the constitutionality of 
section 5, but emphasized in no uncertain terms that “the Act now raises 
serious constitutional concerns.”21 Commenting on the Court’s decision, 
Professor Ellen Katz has written that “Chief Justice [Roberts] 
relentlessly pile[d] up reason after reason why the 2006 reauthorization is 
constitutionally infirm,” signaling that, unless Congress acts to remedy its 
deficiencies, the Court would not hesitate to step in.22 
This Article argues, counterintuitively and contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, that the preclearance regime has been consistent 
with decentralization and is not nearly as intrusive as is generally 
assumed. Materially and substantively, section 5 is remarkably 
accommodating to state and local preferences and practices. It is much 
less disruptive than portrayed. Section 5 permits jurisdictions to retain or 
experiment with their election systems, so long as they comply with the 
information requests of an expanded monitoring system and show that 
their chosen laws affecting elections satisfy a rather lenient 
nonretrogression standard.23 The contention that section 5 is consistent 
with decentralization and localism counters the unchallenged argument 
that section 5’s “federalism costs” should weigh heavily in the 
constitutional balance. To the contrary, the VRA’s relative sensitivity to 
local autonomy and to the promotion of political participation by 
governmental and nongovernmental actors contributed to its 
phenomenal success. This alternative reading of section 5 affords a 
critical perspective on the NAMUDNO decision, as well as of Bartlett v. 
Strickland,24 which was decided during the previous term. I argue that the 
NAMUDNO Court’s expansion of the bailout provision, and the 
Strickland Court’s refusal to protect coalition districts are at cross-
purposes. 
The analysis presented in these pages also contributes to a broader 
literature on institutional change and civil rights administration. It 
compares the much more equivocal results of the one-person/one-vote 
rule to the success of section 5 preclearance. In stark contrast to the 
VRA’s “quiet revolution,” the Supreme Court’s one-person/one-vote 
command required immediate nationwide implementation of a uniform 
 
 20. Appellant’s Brief at 23, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322), 2009 WL 453246. 
 21. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2505. 
 22. Ellen D. Katz, From Bush v. Gore to NAMUDNO: A Response to Professor Amar, 61 Fla. L. 
Rev. 991, 998 (2009). 
 23. See generally Karlan, supra note 3 (describing the evolution of the retrogression standard). 
 24. 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1249 (2009). 
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one-size-fits-all rule, that ultimately failed to vindicate the inherently 
group-based rights threatened by vote dilution.25 Comparing how the 
VRA succeeded in promoting a national antidiscrimination norm 
without treating states and local jurisdictions like “conquered provinces” 
speaks to the role of governance structures in the implementation of civil 
rights. In exploring these contrasts, this Article seeks to extend an 
institutional approach to the implementation of civil rights. It is 
sympathetic to the pragmatic model of “experimentalist, learning-by-
monitoring institutions,” elaborated by what some have referred to as a 
“New Institutionalism.”26 As a study of VRA administration pointed out: 
[J]ust as the necessary elements of a social service program are in the 
hands of different individuals and groups, the capacity to comply (or 
not to comply) with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act is in the 
hands of officials in covered jurisdictions who are relatively independent 
of those federal government officials who are seeking to obtain 
compliance.27 
More recently, Professor Heather Gerken’s call for a “Democracy 
Index” has issued the challenge of investigating and reporting more 
systematically on the practices and procedures of state and local election 
administration. Gerken’s purpose is to encourage best practices that 
engage local actors in the service of democratization.28 Gerken and 
others deplore what they see as the hyper-decentralization of the U.S. 
election system.29 They blame localism and partisanship for the dismal 
state of election administration.30 This Article argues that the preclearance 
 
 25. See, e.g., James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. 
Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 Hastings L.J. 1, 3–4 
(1982). 
 26. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era 
of State Sovereignty, 93 Va. L. Rev. 959, 1017 (2007); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 271 (1998); Joanne Scott & Susan 
Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 565, 
568 (2006); Susan Sturm, Conclusion to Responses—The Architecture of Inclusion: Interdisciplinary 
Insights on Pursuing Institutional Citizenship, 30 Harv. J.L. & Gender 409, 410 (2007); Susan Sturm & 
Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. Disp. Resol. 1, 6. For similar 
developments in the area of human rights, see Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation of the 
Poor: New Governance, New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of Poverty, 
13 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 1, 5 (2010). 
 27. Howard Ball et al., Compromised Compliance: Implementation of the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act 19 (1982). 
 28. Heather K. Gerken, The Democracy Index: Why Our Election System Is Failing and 
How to Fix It 6 (2009); see also Richard L. Hasen, Election Administration Reform and the New 
Institutionalism, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1075, 1077 (2010) (book review). 
 29. Gerken, supra note 28, at 20, 21–23; Daniel P. Tokaji, The Birth and Rebirth of Election 
Administration, 6 Election L.J. 118, 121 (2007) (reviewing Roy G. Saltman, The History and 
Politics of Voting Technology: In Quest of Integrity and Public Confidence (2006)); see also 
Heather K. Gerken, Shortcuts to Reform, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1582, 1586 (2009). 
 30. Gerken, supra note 28, at 15; see also Michael S. Kang, To Here from Theory in Election Law, 
87 Tex. L. Rev. 787, 792 (2010) (reviewing Gerken, supra note 28). 
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provision of the VRA is a comparative bright spot. “Because the 
Democracy Index provides the right information in the right form,” 
writes Gerken, “it should harness the two major obstacles to reform—
partisanship and localism—in the service of reform.”31 This Article shows 
that the section 5 preclearance has embodied important aspects of such 
an approach. 
Part I articulates the standard view of section 5, which reflects the 
widely held belief that progress in civil rights more generally has been 
driven by the derogation of local autonomy and a “nationalization of 
civil liberties.” 
Part II discusses Congress’s 2006 Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization (“VRARA”) and the constitutional challenge to the 
new VRA raised by the NAMUDNO case. It argues that the 
NAMUDNO Court’s decision to reinterpret and expand the VRA’s 
bailout provision offers key insights about the institutional structure of 
the VRA. 
Part III is the heart of the Article. It probes the extent of the VRA’s 
encroachment on state and local autonomy. Part III.A clarifies how the 
term “localism” is understood in the context of a “new institutionalism.” 
III.B offers an alternative interpretation of the institutional architecture 
of section 5 preclearance and its impact on local jurisdictions. III.C 
considers the extent to which this alternative interpretation is consistent 
with the different phases of section 5’s historical development. 
Part IV questions the insistence on “straightforward, reasonably 
administrable, mathematical” bright-line rules in the election context—
such as the Supreme Court’s one-person/one-vote rulings and its recent 
50% rule defining protected majority-minority districts in Bartlett v. 
Strickland. Part V sets forth the constitutional implications and then 
concludes. 
I.  The Standard View: Localism or Rights 
The standard view of section 5’s intrusiveness reflects the standard 
view of civil rights as uniform national regimes that admit of no local 
variation, but are imposed by centralized authorities with the aim of 
suppressing deviant local practices. Part I.A briefly outlines this 
traditional liberal conception of rights. Part I.B describes in some detail 
the charge of section 5’s extraordinary intervention into state and local 
lawmaking. 
 
 31. Gerken, supra note 28, at 6. 
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A. The Tensions Between Localism and Rights 
There has always been a structural tension between localism and 
rights.32 In the United States, federal civil rights that could be asserted 
against the states were first “born in a burst of national centralization” 
with the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments and the expansion 
of federal judicial power necessary to enforce them.33 The subsequent 
“long march towards freedom” for African-Americans was, by most 
accounts, accomplished by what Herbert Wechsler called the 
“nationalization of civil rights.”34 This nationalization of governmental 
authority, in the form of increasingly forceful federal civil rights 
regimes,35 aimed precisely at the disruption of longstanding local 
practices in the Jim Crow South.36 Meanwhile, elites in the South sought 
to perpetuate local regimes of domination, exploitation, and exclusion by 
appealing to States’ rights and constitutional limits on national 
governmental authority.37 
 
 32. See, e.g., Robert Post, Federalism and Civil Rights, in 3 Encyclopedia of the American 
Constitution 1007 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000); see also Howard Ball 
et al., supra note 27, at 117 (“[T]he extension of civil liberties, including voting rights, in the United 
States has evolved out of a constant struggle to replace localized procedures with more standard, 
national ones.”). 
 33. Post, supra note 32, at 1007. 
 34. See Herbert Wechsler, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, 12 Tex. Q. 10, 
10 (Supp. 1968); see also Hugh Davis Graham, Voting Rights and the American Regulatory State, in 
Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective 177 (Bernard Grofman 
& Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) [hereinafter Controversies in Minority Voting]. 
 35. See James T. Patterson, The Rise of Rights and Rights Consciousness, 1930s–1970s, in 
Contesting Democracy: Substance and Structure in American Political History 1775–2000, at 
201, 213–15 (Byron E. Shafer & Anthony J. Badger eds., 2001). 
 36. See Post, supra note 32, at 1007. (“These rights . . . were self-conscious efforts to eradicate 
aspects of the indigenous culture of the southern states traceable to the institution of slavery.” 
(emphasis omitted)); see also Anthony W. Marx, Race-Making and the Nation-State, 48 World Pol. 
180, 203–04 (1996) (“In the United States the South had been appeased by allowing formal racial 
discrimination on the local level. By midcentury . . . . greater central state consolidation and white 
national unity [allowed] . . . . [t]he federal balance of power [to be] gradually reconfigured toward the 
center. Meanwhile, despite Southern resistance, increased black protest encouraged by and pushing 
for further reforms, pressed for the application of central power against localized racial policies. By 
midcentury the centralized American polity had become strong enough to intervene in the historically 
most contentious and last bastion of states’ rights. . . . [O]fficial racial domination was ended by strong 
action from the center . . . .”). 
 37. See, e.g., Governor J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina Speaks to Southern Governors, 
February 7, 1948, in States’ Rights and American Federalism: A Documentary History 190–91 
(Frederick D. Drake & Lynn R. Nelson eds., 1999) (reacting to President Truman’s call for a national 
Commission on Civil Rights); The Southern Manifesto, 1956, in States’ Rights and American 
Federalism, supra, at 203–04; States’ Rights Platform of 1948, Southern Democratic Convention, 
Birmingham, Alabama, July 17, 1948, in States’ Rights and American Federalism, supra, at 193–95. 
This pattern persists in that conservative opposition to expanded minority civil rights protections, 
including voting rights, frequently takes the form of deploring “arbitrary federal interference with 
local and state . . . arrangements in violation of the constitution.” Abigail M. Thernstrom, Whose 
Votes Count? Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights 75 (1987). 
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The gradual “nationalization of civil rights” culminated in the 
Warren Court’s doctrine that federal civil rights protections were 
minimum national standards of decency, below which no local 
experimentation or variation would be tolerated. The Supreme Court 
would stand as the final arbiter of such nationally uniform protections. 
Justice Brennan articulated this view most forcefully: 
I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment fully applied the provisions 
of the Federal Bill of Rights to the states, thereby creating a federal 
floor of protection and that the Constitution and the Fourteenth 
Amendment allow diversity only above and beyond this federal 
constitutional floor. Experimentation which endangers the continued 
existence of our national rights and liberties cannot be permitted; a call 
for that brand of diversity is, in my view, antithetical to the 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. While state 
experimentation may flourish in the space above this floor, we have 
made a national commitment to this minimum level of protection 
through enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. This reconciliation 
of local autonomy and guaranteed individual rights is the only one 
consistent with our constitutional structure.38 
Separate from the Court’s (selective) incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 
Congress, by means of the Civil Rights Act of 196439 and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, “asserted centralized federal authority over areas of 
policy (customer choice, job discrimination, voting requirements) that 
had hitherto remained under local control” and produced novel national 
administrative structures and methods of enforcement.40 
The tension between centralization and localism is also reflected in 
the universalism/particularism debate in liberal political theory.41 
Fundamental rights have generally been understood to somehow 
transcend the pluralistic give and take of national or local interest groups 
in a democratic polity, guaranteeing universal freedoms to individuals 
that apply uniformly throughout the nation and define what it means to 
be not merely a citizen, but a person.42 Liberals disagreed on the list and 
definition of such rights. But they agreed on the “priority” of these rights 
over competing “conceptions of the good life,” or, put differently, over 
 
 38. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as 
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 550 (1986). 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–d(7) (2006). 
 40. Graham, supra note 34, at 177, 184. 
 41. This conceptual tension can be resolved. First, the elusiveness of the content of such concepts 
as natural rights, universal rights, human rights, and civil rights open up a space for diverse 
interpretations. Second, conceptual clarity can be achieved at the level of principle, while recognizing 
that the institutionalization of these principles, and their application and enforcement in practice, 
involve specifications that are largely underdetermined by any theory. 
 42. This view was expressed most forcefully by John Rawls’s conception of the “priority of the 
right over the good,” the classic philosophical statement of progressive liberalism in the 1960s and 
1970s. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 31 (1971). 
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self-understandings and value-systems that differed across communities 
into which individuals were embedded.43 
B. Covered Jurisdictions as “Conquered Provinces” 
According to the standard view, the VRA was no exception to this 
narrative. Since its inception, the VRA, and the preclearance regime in 
particular, have been regarded as an unprecedented federal intrusion 
into state and local government autonomy that “destroys local control of 
the means of self-government” and “strips locally elected officials of 
their autonomy to chart policy.”44 
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, Justice Hugo Black wrote 
famously in dissent that, with section 5, 
some of the States cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional 
amendments without first being compelled to beg federal authorities to 
approve their policies, [and this] so distorts our constitutional structure 
of government as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution 
between state and federal power almost meaningless. . . . I cannot help 
but believe that the inevitable effect of any such law which forces any 
one of the States to entreat federal authorities in far-away places for 
approval of local laws before they can become effective is to create the 
impression that the State or States treated in this way are little more 
than conquered provinces.45 
The Supreme Court has upheld preclearance as a constitutional, 
even if “uncommon,”46 use of congressional power, not because section 
5’s substantial intrusion on state and local autonomy was a subject of 
reasonable disagreement,47 but because “principles of federalism that 
might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority [were] 
necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War 
Amendments ‘by appropriate legislation.’”48 In Lopez v. Monterey 
County, the Court explained that:  
  We have recognized that the Act, which authorizes federal intrusion 
into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking, imposes substantial 
“federalism costs.” The Act was passed pursuant to Congress’ authority 
under the Fifteenth Amendment, however, and we have likewise 
acknowledged that the Reconstruction Amendments by their nature 
 
 43. The idea of “human rights” is, in this sense, a closely related concept. See generally Louis 
Henkin et al., Human Rights (2009) (providing a comprehensive analysis of human rights law).  
 44. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 201–02 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 45. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 358–60 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 46. Id. at 334 (majority opinion). 
 47. The impassioned dissent from Justice Black on the threat to the principles of federalism posed 
by section 5 has echoed down through later dissents of Justices Lewis Powell, John Paul Stevens, and 
William Rehnquist. See City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 472–80 (1987) (Powell, 
J., dissenting); City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 206 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v. Bd. of 
Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 140 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 48. City of Rome, 435 U.S. at 179 (majority opinion) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 
456 (1976)); Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334 (majority opinion). 
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contemplate some intrusion into areas traditionally reserved to the 
States.49 
The preclearance regime of the VRA departed decisively from the 
court-centered enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1957,50 which 
required citizens to bring suit and prove violations in the traditionally 
more conservative courts.51 Such civil rights actions against state and 
local officials vindicated violations ex post on a case-by-case basis.52 A 
traditional civil rights action required that a plaintiff with standing show 
intent and surmount considerable procedural hurdles in addition to 
proving the facts and circumstances of the violation.53 In the election 
context, the procedural hurdles are compounded by the fact that 
elections are usually over by the time a court can consider the 
constitutional violations. 
In contrast, the preclearance regime is prophylactic and requires 
covered jurisdictions to obtain approval for new election related laws ex 
ante, that is, before such law can be placed on the books and enforced.54 
Section 5 requires covered state and local jurisdictions to submit all law 
changes affecting voting to the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division (or the 
District Court for the District of Columbia) for approval.55 The 
submitting jurisdiction has the burden of showing that the law does not 
 
 49. 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999) (citations omitted) (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926 (1995); 
City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179)); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626–27 (2000). 
 50. Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 131, 71 Stat. 634, 637 (1957). 
 51. Graham, supra note 34, at 182. 
 52. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 360 (Black, J., dissenting) (“I do not mean to cast any doubt whatever 
upon the indisputable power of the Federal Government to invalidate a state law once enacted and 
operative on the ground that it intrudes into the area of supreme federal power. But the Federal 
Government has heretofore always been content to exercise this power to protect federal supremacy 
by authorizing its agents to bring lawsuits against state officials once and operative state law has 
created an actual case and controversy.”). 
 53. See Martin A. Schwartz & Kathryn R. Urbonya, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Section 1983 
Litigation 4 (2d ed. 2008) (“[E]ven if a plaintiff establishes a violation of a federally protected right, 
she may not necessarily obtain relief. Courts may deny relief after resolving numerous other issues: 
jurisdictional questions, such as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment, and 
standing and mootness; affirmative defenses, such as absolute and qualified immunity; and other 
issues, such as the statute of limitation, preclusion, and various abstention doctrines.”). Limitations on 
§§ 1971 and 1973 actions prior to 1960 were even more significant. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that Congress enacted § 1983 to provide an independent federal remedy 
supplement to the available state law remedies). This caused the NAACP and other civil rights 
organizations to shift their strategy from litigation to mass-based protest. Frank R. Parker, Black 
Votes Count: Political Empowerment in Mississippi After 1965, at 9 (1990). 
 54. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 360 (“A federal law which assumes the power to compel the States to 
submit in advance any proposed legislation they have for approval by federal agents approaches 
dangerously near to wiping the States out as useful and effective units in the government of our 
country.”). 
 55. 28 C.F.R. § 51.52 (2010). 
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discriminate.56 The Attorney General has the power to veto the law by 
interposing an “objection.”57 
Because it operates ex ante, the preclearance process might be 
compared to an injunction. Relying on this analogy, conservatives have 
suggested that a heightened standard ought to apply to coverage by 
section 5. In an ordinary civil rights action, only an emergency that 
threatened irreparable harm to identifiable plaintiffs would justify 
issuance of an injunction.58 In addition, such a remedy requires a 
showing, by the plaintiff, that no other remedy at law could offer 
adequate relief and that the preliminary injunction or temporary 
restraining order in fact serves to redress the harm of which some 
complain.59 
Neither the statute nor the guidelines for the preclearance process 
impose a heightened standard on the preclearance decision. The covered 
jurisdiction must submit all new laws that affect voting for preclearance 
regardless of whether concerns have been raised about the new law. The 
submitting authority has the burden of proving it does not discriminate. 
No plaintiff need come forward. The injunction analogy therefore only 
highlights the unusual ex ante constraints placed on states and localities 
by the preclearance regime. 
It follows that submitting jurisdictions do not enjoy the full 
procedural rights they would enjoy in court or under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.60 The sixty-day review process is necessarily informal, 
there is no opportunity for a hearing, and the determinations themselves 
have been criticized as “standardless.”61 The Attorney General’s decision 
is not subject to administrative review, except that a submitting 
jurisdiction has the option of bringing a de novo action for preclearance 
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia62—a 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006). 
 59. In this vein, conservative opponents of the VRA have argued that such a heightened standard 
should govern the inquiry under City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997), as to the 
“congruence and proportionality” of Congress’s use of its Civil War Amendment enforcement powers 
in reauthorizing the VRA in 2006. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a) & (b). Ed Blum and others have thus 
suggested that preclearance can no longer be justified, because the national emergency of extreme 
racism, exploitation, and political exclusion of the early- to mid-1960s in the South has passed. See 
Edward Blum, Unintended Consequences of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 5 (2007). 
 60. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–06 (2006). 
 61. In Miller v. Johnson, for example, plaintiffs argued that the flexibility was so great that the 
DOJ’s Voting Section “has no established fact-finding procedures, no administrative hearing and no 
discernible standards for evaluating information.” Brief of the Appellees at 41–42, Miller v. Johnson, 
515 U.S. 900 (1995) (No. 94-631). 
 62. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006); Morris v. Gresette, 432 U.S. 491, 502 
(1977). But this alternative to administrative preclearance is rarely pursued. Samuel Issacharoff et 
al., The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the Political Process 525 (3d ed. 2007). 
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forum intentionally removed from the local district courts.63 A related 
but separate issue is the persistent concern that section 5 gives a federal 
executive agency undue discretion over state and local political geography 
that can be manipulated for partisan political purposes.64 
The scope of the preclearance requirement has also been criticized 
as overbroad and burdensome. Allen v. State Board of Elections,65 
together with Perkins v. Matthews,66 interpreted voting changes subject to 
preclearance very broadly.67 The Supreme Court included at least seven 
basic types of voting changes within the scope of section 5: redistricting, 
annexation, changes in polling places, precinct changes, re-registration 
procedures, incorporations, and changes in election laws such as filing 
fees and at-large elections.68 Allen also required preclearance for changes 
mandated by federal law.69 
The perceived intrusiveness of section 5 informed debates about the 
VRARA.70 During the reauthorization debate, critics and defenders of 
preclearance agreed that section 5 authorized a “unique” intrusion into 
state and local autonomy with significant “federalism costs.”71 Echoing 
the Rehnquist Court’s retrogression decisions, critics of section 5 urged 
 
 63. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966) (majority opinion) (“South Carolina 
and certain of the amici curiae maintain that §§ 4(a) and 5, buttressed by § 14(b) of the Act, abridge 
due process by limiting litigation to a distant forum.”). 
 64. J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 86 Tex. L. 
Rev. 667, 668 n.4 (2008) (“Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee in 1965 stressed the 
partisan dangers of assigning preclearance to the Department of Justice.”); see also Daniel P. Tokaji, If 
It’s Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 49 How. L.J. 785 (2006). 
 65. 393 U.S. 544, 566–69 (1969). 
 66. 400 U.S. 379, 388 (1970) (holding that voting booth changes, annexation of land, and changes 
from ward to at-large elections were voting changes subject to preclearance). 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (declaring that preclearance extends to any “voting qualifications or 
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure” without further specification). 
 68. See Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 502–503 (1992); Allen, 393 U.S. at 565–69; 
Howard Ball et al., supra note 27, at 19, 66–67. 
 69. Howard Ball et al., supra note 27, at 565 n.29. This became critically important during the 
implementation of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (Motor Voter Act), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10 (2006), and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–
15545 (Supp. II 2002); see Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273, 283 (1997) (rejecting Mississippi’s argument 
that Motor Voter’s implementation was not a covered change). 
 70. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization 
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973 to 1973aa-1 (2006)). 
 71. Blum, supra note 59, at 4–5 (“Many legal observers noted that Section 5 was a significant 
departure from the way responsibilities between the federal and state governments were allocated at 
the time the Constitution was ratified. Section 5 did something no other bill in the history of the nation 
had ever done before: For a limited period of time, it required every political subdivision targeted by 
the act to get permission from the federal government before any change to election procedures could 
take place. In other words, the federal government was no longer limited to challenging in the courts a 
racially discriminatory change in election procedures or practices after it had gone into effect; the 
federal government now had the power to prevent such changes from going into effect at all.”); see 
also U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra note 8, at 25–28 (statement of Roger Clegg). 
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that the preclearance regime’s disproportionate interference in state and 
local law should weigh heavily in the constitutional balance.72 Proponents 
of section 5 conceded the “unique procedures it requires of states and 
localities that want to change their laws.”73 Congress’s “vote was 
remarkable,” wrote Professor Nathaniel Persily, “in that almost all 
participants in the policy debate recognize[d] that section 5 of the VRA 
represents a unique exception to the normal functioning of 
federalism . . . .”74 
II.  Controversies in the Wake of the VRARA 
A constitutional challenge to section 5 was expected to reach the 
Court after Congress passed the VRARA. The VRARA renewed key 
sunsetting provisions of the VRA for another twenty-five years.75 It also 
overturned two important decisions by the Court that had rolled back 
the kind of racial vote discrimination that would trigger an objection by 
the Attorney General under section 5.76 In reversing these decisions, 
Congress threw down the gauntlet to the Court.77 
 
 72. Appellants in NAMUDNO echoed the Rehnquist Court’s retrogression decisions, which 
stressed the heavy “federalism costs” of section 5 preclearance and repeated the arguments of critics 
on record against VRARA. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320, 
336 (2000); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish I), 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997); Blum, supra 
note 59, at 5; U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra note 8, at 53–54 (statement of Abigail Thernstrom, 
Vice Chair). 
 73. Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 Yale L.J. 174, 
177 (2007) (“[Section 5] stands alone in American history in its alteration of authority between the 
federal government and the states and the unique procedures it requires of states and localities that 
want to change their laws. No other statute applies only to a subset of the country and requires 
covered states and localities to get permission from the federal government before implementing a 
certain type of law.”). 
 74. Id. at 180. 
 75. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization 
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973 to 1973aa-1 (2006)); see also Persily, supra note 73. 
 76. The monitoring and preclearance provision under section 5 had been interpreted by the Court 
to permit de facto constitutional violations, but not changes in the law that would roll back or 
“retrogress” the voting rights gains by blacks and other protected minorities. In Bossier Parish I, the 
Supreme Court took this doctrine to its extreme when it held that only a specific “intent to retrogress” 
could trigger an objection. 520 U.S. at 328. In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court redefined how 
safeguarding the “minority group’s effective exercise of the electoral franchise” would henceforth be 
understood, permitting trade-offs between influence districts and majority-minority districts under 
section 5’s nonretrogression standard and undercutting the “ability to elect” minority-preferred 
candidates as the measure of progress. 539 U.S. 461, 479 (2003). The VRARA restored the intent 
standard and reaffirmed ability-to-elect districts as the focus of minority vote dilution inquiry. Sec. 5, 
§ 5(b)–(c), 120 Stat. at 580–81. 
 77. Richard H. Pildes, Political Avoidance, Constitutional Theory, and the VRA, 117 Yale L.J. 
Pocket Part 148, 153 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/12/10/pildes.html.  
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A. Congress’s Failure of Deliberation 
The Supreme Court had, over the years, made it increasingly clear 
that it would carefully scrutinize the congressional record to police 
Congress’s use of its enforcement powers under the Civil War 
Amendments.78 The VRARA was generally perceived to have rendered 
section 5 and its related provisions particularly vulnerable in this regard. 
The VRARA renewed section 5 and the other sunsetting provisions of 
the Act for another twenty-five years without further amendment. Due 
to political pressure and the complexity of the issues involved, Congress 
inadequately addressed how the VRA might be amended to reflect the 
dramatic progress in racial and minority inclusion in voting since 1965.79 
Conservatives argued that section 5 was a “temporary, emergency” 
regime in 1965 and that “the emergency has passed.”80 During the period 
leading up to the passage of the VRARA, leading scholars on all sides 
recognized that progress in racial vote discrimination should be reflected 
in the renewal legislation.81 
For example, coverage by the preclearance provision continues to 
be triggered by a formula that singles out the Southern states. Coverage 
is, inter alia, based on the proportion of minority voter registrants or 
votes cast in a given state in 1964 or 1968.82 But the numbers have 
changed significantly since then, with the proportion of registered 
minority voters in some covered states exceeding those in states that are 
exempt from preclearance.83 Evidence that private enforcement actions 
under section 2 were no more common in covered jurisdictions than in 
jurisdictions exempt from preclearance has been taken to suggest that 
discrimination was just as likely to occur in jurisdictions not covered by 
 
 78. See generally Ellen Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 
1179 (2001) (describing the Supreme Court’s increasingly hostile position on the Attorney General’s 
exercise of her preclearance powers). 
 79. See Katz, supra note 22, at 991–95, 997–1000; Persily, supra note 73, at 119–44. 
 80. See, e.g., Abigail Thernstrom, Emergency Exit, N.Y. Sun (Jul. 29, 2005), http://www.nysun.com/ 
article/17784; see also Blum, supra note 59, at 5–10; U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra note 8, at 26 
(statement of Roger Clegg); id. at 21–23 (statement of Edward Blum); id. at 53–54 (statement of 
Abigail Thernstorm); Abigail Thernstrom & Edward Blum, Voting Rights Act: After 40 years, It’s Time 
for Virginia to Move on, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 1, 2005, at A11. 
 81. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1710; Richard H. Pildes, Political Competition and the 
Modern VRA, in The Future of the Voting Rights Act 1, 7–8 (David Epstein et al. eds., 2006) 
(concluding that political developments with regard to racial minorities had so improved in this 
country, in large part due to the success of the Voting Rights Act, that section 5 as applied pre-
Ashcroft could actually harm the rights of minority voters); Tokaji, supra note 64, 785–86; see also The 
Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 11–13, 198–207 (2006) (testimony and prepared statement of Richard H. Pildes). But see id. at 
4–6, 8–9 (2006) (testimony of Professors Pamela S. Karlan and Theodore S. Arrington). 
 82. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a, 1973b(a), 1973c (2006). 
 83. Tokaji, supra note 64, at 273.  
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the Act.84 Instead, the persistence of racially polarized voting in covered 
(Southern) states was heavily relied upon as evidence for the continued 
need for the special provisions of the VRA; however, racially-polarized 
voting is also prevalent in many non-covered jurisdictions, which are not 
subject to preclearance.85 
Some commentators therefore proposed changes in the coverage 
formula.86 Gerken, for example, argued for expanding potential coverage 
nationwide, but limiting actual coverage to only those jurisdictions that 
had “opted in.”87 Under the “opt-in” proposal, coverage by the 
preclearance regime would be triggered upon the application of local 
minority representatives to the DOJ.88 An “opt-in” trigger, according to 
Gerken, would preserve the power of minority groups to bargain for 
equal representation in the shadow of section 5.89 Gerken’s proposal had 
the virtue of basing coverage on actual state and local conditions as they 
currently exist, rather than on an outdated formula that many deem 
arbitrary. 
Another proposal to update coverage was to expand the bailout 
provision.90 Jurisdictions covered by section 5 can apply to terminate 
coverage, or “bail out.” To terminate coverage, a jurisdiction must show 
that it has not discriminated for at least ten years and has made 
consistent efforts to expand minority participation in all aspects of the 
political process.91 Few jurisdictions have availed themselves of the 
bailout provision, in part, because bailout was restricted.92 Towns, cities, 
 
 84. See Katz, supra note 4, at 188 (showing that although roughly the same number of section 2 
decisions were identified in covered jurisdictions and uncovered jurisdictions, plaintiffs were more 
likely to prevail in covered jurisdictions). Whereas section 5 of the VRA requires covered jurisdictions 
to submit all new laws that affect voting to the United States Attorney General for “preclearance,” 
section 2 of the VRA, as amended, provides a private right of action to challenge racial vote 
discrimination nationwide. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). Section 2 essentially tracks the language in the 
Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
 85. Katz, supra note 4, at 188; see also Heather K. Gerken, Essay, A Third Way for the Voting 
Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-in Approach, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 708, 745 (2006). Katz argues, based 
on the empirical record in section 2 cases, that racially polarized voting in covered jurisdictions is often 
more extreme. See Katz et al., supra note 4. Ultimately, Congress relied on Katz’s study, which 
appears in the Appendix to the congressional record of the VRARA. To Examine the Impact and 
Effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 964–1124 (2005) (including study from the Voting Rights 
Initiative of the University of Michigan Law School).  
 86. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 85; Michael P. McDonald, Who’s Covered? Coverage Formula 
and Bailout, in The Future of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 81, at 255. 
 87. Gerken, supra note 85. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. J. Gerald Hebert, An Assessment of the Bailout Provisions of the Voting Rights Act, in Voting 
Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006, supra note 4, at 257; McDonald, supra note 86, at 268. 
 91. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (2006). 
 92. See Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act—History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2599–834 (2005) 
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and other local government units within covered states could not bail out 
separately from their counties.93 Because states or counties eligible for 
bailout must show that all of their political subdivisions are eligible for 
bailout, statewide elections in that county are still covered until the 
entire state can show that it meets the criteria for bailout, even if 
counties can make that showing.94 As a result, only twelve jurisdictions—
out of more than 12,000 covered political subdivisions—have successfully 
bailed out of the Act since 1982.95 To expand the bailout provision would 
have provided one way to phase out preclearance over time.96 One 
proposal made during the reauthorization debate was for Congress to 
examine the possibility of allowing local governmental subunits within a 
covered county to bail out.97 
Neither these nor other proposals for reform were adopted.98 
Instead, Congress amended the VRA only to reinstate the construction 
of the Act that had existed prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier Parish II) and Georgia v. 
Ashcroft, while renewing the Act for another twenty-five years.99 Many 
commentators have described congressional action on the VRARA as a 
“failure of deliberation.”100 In the NAMUDNO case, the Supreme Court 
“found a way to send the statute back to Congress for deliberation.”101 
 
(detailing the bailouts). 
 93. In the rare exception that a town or city conducted its own voter registration, it could seek 
bailout under section 4(a), as amended in 1982. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1988). 
 94. See generally Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 231 
(D.D.C. 2008) (discussing the expansion of bailout eligibility in the 1982 amendments to include 
political subdivisions), rev’d sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 
(2009); Hebert, supra note 90, at 257 (discussing the number of bailouts since the 1982 amendments). 
 95. Hebert, supra note 90, at 257.  
 96. See Rick Hasen, Drafting a Proactive Bailout Measure for VRA Reauthorization, Election 
Law Blog (May 18, 2006, 9:37 AM), http://www.electionlawblog.org/archives/005655.html (proposing 
a “proactive bailout measure” as part of the VRA reauthorization). But see J. Gerald Hebert, Bailouts 
and the Voting Rights Act: Observations About Rick Hasen’s Proposals, Campaign Legal Ctr. Blog 
(June 20, 2006), http://www.clcblog.org/blog_item-34.html (critiquing Hasen’s proposal). 
 97. Hebert, supra note 90, at 274. Hebert has served as legal counsel to all of the jurisdictions that 
have bailed out since the 1982 amendments were enacted. Id. at 257 n.1. 
 98. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 86, at 262–70 (discussing modification of the definition of 
“Test or Device,” modification of the participation component in the coverage formula, modification 
of the bailout mechanism, and certain technical amendments to section 4, upon which section 5 
depends); Tokaji, supra note 64, at 830–35 (arguing for the establishment of an independent bipartisan 
commission or “super agency” for voting to administer preclearance, and allowing opponents to 
challenge a DOJ preclearance decision in court); Abigail Thernstrom & Edward Blum, Op-Ed., Do 
the Right Thing, Wall St. J., July 15, 2005, at A10 (arguing that Congress should let section 5 expire in 
2007). 
 99. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott King, and César E. Chàvez Voting Rights 
Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, S. Rep. No. 109-295, at 15 (2006) (citing 
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 
320 (2000)). 
 100. Katz, supra note 22, at 999. 
 101. Id. 
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B. NAMUDNO’s Promise 
Congress’s failure to tailor the VRARA to changed circumstances 
was front and center in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 
One v. Mukasey, a case that reached the Supreme Court in 2009.102 The 
plaintiff in NAMUDNO was a special purpose district in Texas that 
sought relief from the burdens of preclearance by seeking bailout under 
section 4(b) of the VRA.103 In the alternative, NAMUDNO claimed that 
section 5 was unconstitutional, because the severe encroachments of the 
preclearance requirement could no longer be justified as a “congruent 
and proportional” remedy for ongoing constitutional violations.104 
NAMUDNO was filed with the District Court for the District of 
Columbia within days of the passage of the VRARA. Its progress was 
closely watched. 
To bail out from under the special provisions of the act, an eligible 
jurisdiction must seek a declaratory judgment from a three-judge panel 
in the D.C. court and essentially prove that during the past ten years, it 
had not engaged in any racial vote discrimination.105 A jurisdiction must 
show that for the previous ten years, it had not used any forbidden voting 
test, had not received a valid objection under section 5, and had not been 
found liable for other voting rights violations. It must also show that it 
had “engaged in constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and 
harassment” of voters, and similar measures.106 The plaintiff argued that 
the district had never engaged in racial vote discrimination, had never 
been found guilty of racial vote discrimination, and had made 
constructive efforts to counter racial vote discrimination.107 
NAMUDNO’s first claim turned on whether the district was a 
“political subdivision” eligible for bailout under the Act.108 Bailout is 
available to smaller political units that are covered separately under the 
Act, such as parts of New York City or Southern California.109 The VRA, 
however, did not at first permit political subdivisions to bail out 
separately if they were covered as part of a covered state. The 1982 
amendments expanded bailout to permit “political subdivisions,” such as 
counties or parishes to terminate coverage, even if their state did not 
 
 102. 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 268 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One 
v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). 
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2006). 
 104. NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 268. 
 105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a)(1), 1973c(a). 
 106. Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(A)–(F). 
 107. Appellant’s Brief at 9–10, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 
(2009) (No. 08-322), 2009 WL 453246. 
 108. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009). 
 109. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 167 (1980) (finding a city ineligible to seek 
bailout, because “the coverage formula of § 4(b) ha[d] never been applied to it.”). 
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satisfy the bailout requirements.110 More specifically, section 14(c)(2) 
provides that “[t]he term ‘political subdivision’ shall mean any county or 
parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under 
the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other 
subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.”111 Thus, 
cities, towns, and other political subdivisions covered as part of a larger 
political unit could not bail out separately; their fate depended on the 
status of the larger political unit: the county, parish, or state.112 
NAMUDNO was neither a county nor a city; nor did it register voters.113 
Accordingly, the district court ruled that NAMUDNO was not entitled 
to bail out, because it was not a “political subdivision” within the special 
meaning of section 14(c)(2) of the VRA.114 The district court’s 
interpretation of the bailout provision was unsurprising. It complied with 
Supreme Court precedent and long-settled statutory interpretation 
principles.115 
The bulk of the district court’s opinion focused on the constitutional 
challenge to section 5, as reauthorized by the VRA: It contained a 
lengthy and detailed examination of the facts and data adduced by 
Congress in support of reauthorization.116 Judge Tatel rejected the 
plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to section 5 and held that the evidence 
of continuing violations that Congress relied on was sufficient to justify 
the restrictions imposed on states and localities by the preclearance 
regime.117 
The case went up to the Supreme Court on direct appeal. In a 
unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court 
reversed.118 The Court granted NAMUDNO the right to seek bailout by 
revisiting and substantially expanding the scope of the statutory bailout 
provision.119 The Court held that bailout was not limited to political 
subdivisions within the special meaning of the Act.120 Under the Court’s 
reinterpretation of the statute, bailout would now be available to any 
political subunit that could meet the criteria. The bailout provision thus 
 
 110. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 1, 96 Stat. 131, 131–34 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)). 
 111. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-110, § 4(c)(2), 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (2006)). 
 112. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 231–32 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 113. Id. at 283. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Katz, supra note 22, at 997–98. 
 116. NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 248–83. 
 117. Id. at 279–82. 
 118. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2517 (2009). 
 119. Id. at 2514–16. 
 120. Id. at 2516. 
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became available to thousands of cities, townships, and special purpose 
districts, such as NAMUDNO. 
Notably, the Supreme Court refrained from striking down the 
preclearance regime, but instead tweaked the existing statutory and 
administrative framework to permit incremental changes. It empowered 
local actors to apply for bailout. The bailout determination is henceforth 
based on local conditions, which local jurisdictions have the power to 
affect. 
Because many more political units and subunits are now eligible for 
preclearance, observers expected an increase in bailout requests.121 
Presumably, cities that achieve bailout will reflect something like “best 
practices” or at least better practices. Cities that have not yet bailed out, 
but are interested in doing so, can presumably look to cities that have in 
order to see how it is done and what it takes. The new bailout scheme 
should, therefore, encourage the adoption of something like “best 
practices.”122 Furthermore, the more cities that bail out, the greater the 
stigma to those that do not. Political units can now come clean if they 
want. After NAMUDNO, their fate is in their own hands. Lingering local 
resentment against being singled out as racist, and subjected to ongoing 
monitoring by Washington, reasonably should give way to self-
examination. Cities surrounded by neighbors who have successfully 
bailed out can no longer blame outdated conceptions or unfounded bias 
for their subjection to the preclearance regime.123 
Whereas the Court expressly avoided the broader constitutional 
issue, it emphasized in no uncertain terms that the Act “raises serious 
 
 121. Telephone Interview with J. Gerald Hebert, Attorney (Nov. 18, 2010); see also Jeremy Duda, 
Dumping a Burden: Counties Pick Right Time to Challenge Voting-Rights Strictures, 
AZCapitolTimes.com (Feb. 4, 2011, 8:10 AM), http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2011/02/04/dumping-a-
burden-counties-pick-right-time-to-challenge-voting-rights-strictures/. 
 122. See, e.g., Paul F. Hancock & Lora L. Tredway, The Bailout Standard of the Voting Rights Act: 
An Incentive to End Discrimination, 17 Urb. Law. 379, 381–82 (1985) (arguing that bailout standard 
provides incentive to comply with federal antidiscrimination standard). 
 123. See, e.g., Jackson’s Plan Would Extend Voting Wrongs, Mobile Reg., Mar. 12, 2005, at A12 
(“In today’s United States, 140 years after the Civil War and 40 years after the passage of the original 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, there is no reason to treat Southern states differently than other 
states. . . . The problem with the current system is that it treats the Southern states as guilty until 
proven innocent, and makes all those states’ residents into second-class citizens compared to the rest 
of the country.”). So far, only two cities have bailed out post-NAMUDNO: Sandy Springs, Georgia, 
and Kings Mountain, North Carolina. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. 
Reaches Agreements with Kings Mountain, N.C., and Sandy Springs, Ga. to Terminate Coverage from 
Preclearance of the Voting Rights Act (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/ 
10-crt-1067.html. Another eight bailout applications are pending. This represents an increase in 
bailout applications. But Gerry Hebert, who is the attorney handling bailouts for many of these 
jurisdictions, believes this increase is likely related to the upcoming redistricting rounds. To the extent 
that more bailouts have not occurred, Hebert suggests that the very limited costs of 99% of 
preclearance submissions (as low as $100 in County time), relative to the upfront cost of bailout, may 
be responsible for the lack of activity. Telephone Interview with J. Gerald Hebert, supra note 121. 
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constitutional questions,” which the Court would not shrink from 
addressing the next time the issue came before it.124 “[T]he Act imposes 
current burdens and must be justified by current needs,” the Chief 
Justice wrote.125 Commentators have noted that the “Chief Justice 
relentlessly pile[d] up reason after reason why the 2006 reauthorization is 
constitutionally infirm[,]” signaling that unless Congress acts to remedy 
its deficiencies, the Court would not hesitate to step in.126 
The NAMUDNO Court’s decision is all the more remarkable 
because it can only be seen as a willful reinterpretation of the bailout 
statute. Katz writes that in NAMUDNO, “all nine Justices agreed that 
the VRA allowed the plaintiff to apply for a statutory exemption that 
Congress never authorized and never intended to allow . . . . [T]he 
Justices simply rewrote it.”127 In Citizens United v. FEC,128 the Court went 
out of its way to strike down congressional limits on corporate and union 
expenditures on political campaigns in a case that could easily have been 
treated as an applied challenge to the McCain-Feingold Act.129 In 
NAMUDNO, the Court did the opposite. It interpreted a facial 
constitutional challenge to the VRA as an applied challenge, granting 
relief to the plaintiff where the statute clearly prohibited such relief. The 
only way of granting relief was for the Court to step into the shoes of the 
legislature and rewrite the statute. 
The Court essentially remanded the VRARA to Congress for 
further deliberation. As Katz puts it, the Court “wisely focused on 
getting Congress to do its job.”130 But it also gave Congress important 
positive guidance on how to proceed. When the Court stepped into the 
shoes of Congress and rewrote the statute, the Court exercised its 
judgment about the functions of the VRA. The decision, as I argue in the 
following parts, reflects the original architecture of the VRA as a 
learning/monitoring regime that seeks to harness local energies in the 
service of a national antidiscrimination policy—even as it promotes 
compliance. 
III.  Local Autonomy Under Section 5 Reconsidered 
The conventional assumption that the federal preclearance regime 
represents heavy-handed federal interference with state and local law-
making has not been adequately considered in light of intergovernmental 
 
 124. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2513. 
 125. Id. at 2512. 
 126. Katz, supra note 22, at 998–99. 
 127. Id. at 992, 997. 
 128. 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010). 
 129. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold Act), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 
Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 8, 18, 28, 36, and 47 U.S.C.). 
 130. Katz, supra note 22, at 999. 
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practice or developing conceptions of institutional design. The view rests 
almost exclusively on constitutional theories of state sovereignty 
narrowly applied to black letter law.131 This Part will show that the 
preclearance regime appears in a different light when viewed through the 
lens of contemporary models of decentralization, regulatory competition, 
and pragmatic “learning/monitoring institutions.” Contrary to the 
conventional view, I argue that preclearance has maintained local 
autonomy and encouraged local participation. It has built on existing 
practices and local knowledge. At the same time, it has advanced a 
fundamental political transformation and brought thousands of 
jurisdictions into greater compliance with a demanding and evolving 
national antidiscrimination standard. Part III.B shows how preclearance 
shares many features of what is sometimes referred to as a “new 
institutional” approach to governance. 
Before moving on to this argument, some clarification of my 
theoretical framework and terminology is in order. In particular, the 
following provides some theoretical context for the meaning and 
normative significance of “localism” in the context of a “new 
institutionalism,” as it is understood here.132 
A. The Significance of “Localism” for the “New Institutional” 
Framework 
Critics of modern nation-building and statism since Friedrich Hayek 
have aptly described state bureaucracies and other national state actors 
as “vexed institutions,” characterized by the need to obtain information 
about and intervene into complex local systems that they can ultimately 
only survey and control by means of “thin simplifications.”133 Such thin 
simplifications abstract considerably from the social practices and 
 
 131. Resnik and others have pointed out the questionable nature of judgments that rely on such 
theories of sovereignty. See Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning 
the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1921, 1926–28 (2003). 
 132. Note that the understanding presented here draws on a number of sources and literatures. 
The treatment to some extent hijacks the term “new institutionalism” and expands on its more narrow 
understanding in legal academia by a group of scholars who have been associated with Columbia Law 
School. See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an 
Era of State Sovereignty, 93 Va. L. Rev. 959 (2007) (proposing a new paradigm for understanding 
“federal empowerment of local governments”); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 26 (discussing a new form of 
government in which local actors are granted autonomy while also sharing their information with 
regional and national bodies); Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Interdisciplinary Insights on 
Pursuing Institutional Citizenship, 30 Harv. J.L. & Gender 409 (2007) (addressing structural inequality 
and the “concepts of institutional citizenship, organizational catalyst, and institutional intermediary”). 
The perspective adopted here draws firsthand from insights in various disciplines and debates, 
including new institutional economics, the democracy and decentralization debates (for want of a 
better term), and conceptions of local knowledge in economics, anthropology, and political science. 
 133. See James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed 11 (1998). 
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institutions that they seek to describe, thus failing to satisfy the 
informational requirements of centralized decisionmakers. Different 
approaches and outcomes are likely to emerge in different geographies 
to the extent that interested local actors respond contextually and 
experientially to identical system-wide goals.134 Unintended consequences 
thus bedevil transformations driven by excessive government 
centralization that fails to appreciate the need for local variation in the 
development and implementation of policy goals. Examples abound 
among the grand projects of nation-building and modernization during 
the twentieth century.135 
Critiques of excessive centralization have promoted a healthy 
skepticism about finding one right solution that applies system-wide. 
They have instead emphasized the importance of “local knowledge,” 
contextual judgment, or praxis—whatever the preferred term. Local 
knowledge is based on experiential learning, is embedded in meaningful 
practices, and cannot be readily standardized and transferred in the form 
of information.136 Centralized decisionmakers cannot adequately replicate 
or anticipate the experientially-based and contextual response of 
interested local actors who base their judgments on their “particular 
circumstances of time and place.”137 Thus, social scientists have 
increasingly become sensitive to the way in which the attempt at 
rendering legible diverse local populations, social practices, political 
interests, and geographies to a central state authority—in standardized, 
formal, often mathematical terms deemed suitable to bureaucratic 
administration—has contributed to positively shaping and homogenizing 
the social and natural objects of such an abstracting gaze with 
unintended consequences.138 Existing local patterns are forced into 
informational grids that render them accessible to the central authority in 
 
 134. Professor Friedrich A. Hayek has argued that central planning is inefficient (and socially and 
politically destructive), because such planning cannot satisfy its own informational requirements. F.A. 
Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 5, 7–8 (2005). Central planning must 
necessarily operate based on limited knowledge that abstracts from particular local conditions and 
exigencies. Id. In contrast, Hayek argued that a market-based allocation through the price-mechanism 
relies on millions of transactions between individuals who base their decisions on their context-specific 
local, often tacit knowledge, thus harnessing local and tacit knowledge by millions of individuals. Id. 
According to Hayek, each person “has some advantage over all others in that he possesses unique 
information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only if the decisions 
depending on it are left to him or are made with his active cooperation.” Id. 
 135. See generally Scott, supra note 133 (discussing the recurring patterns of failure and 
authoritarianism in certain social engineering programs). 
 136. See, e.g., Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive 
Anthropology 167–234 (1983); Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension 3–25 (1966); Scott, supra 
note 133; Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad 85–104 (1994); 
Hayek, supra note 134, at 521–22. 
 137. Hayek, supra note 134, at 521. 
 138. Scott, supra note 133. 
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ways that answer to state administrative goals and policies, but abstract 
from key features of social and ecological systems that support or render 
them meaningful. To mitigate the vicissitudes of these (and other) 
difficulties of centralized actors, researchers and policymakers across the 
political spectrum have advocated increased local autonomy to specify 
policy goals, tailor policy implementation, and set priorities.139 
In legal literature, “localism” has been identified with the normative 
call for greater local autonomy and the positive claim of local legal 
powerlessness advanced by Professor Gerald Frug and other 
communitarian or progressive (“grassroots”) local government scholars 
in the 1970s and 1980s.140 In the 1980s and 1990s, conservative neo-
federalists increasingly embraced localism, justifying limits on federal 
authority under the U.S. Constitution by appealing to these benefits of 
decentralization and then tracing them back to the values of 
Tocquevillian democracy.141 
 
 139. See generally U.S. Aid, Democratic Decentralization Programming Handbook (2009) 
(setting forth comprehensive policy recommendations); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 26; John M. Cohen 
& Stephen B. Peterson, Methodological Issues in the Analysis of Decentralization (Harvard Inst. for 
Int’l Dev., Discussion Paper No. 555, 1996), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/hiid/555.pdf; T.N. 
Srinivasan, Federalism, Decentralization, Globalization and Economic Reforms: Some Issues (Ctr. for 
Research on Econ. Dev. & Pol’y Reform, Working Paper No. 158, 2003), available at 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/siepr/cgi-bin/siepr/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/redpr158.pdf 
(discussing IMF, World Bank, and National Policies). 
 140. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, City Making: Building Communities Without Building Walls 
17, 64–65 (1999) [hereinafter Frug, City Making]; Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The 
Structure of Local Government, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (1990); Jerry Frug, The Geography of 
Community, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1047, 1048 (1996) [hereinafter Frug, Geography]; Jerry Frug, 
Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 253, 254 (1993) [hereinafter Frug, Decentralization]; 
Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 Rutgers L.J. 627, 627–28 (2001). 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(cataloguing the benefits of federalism); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Th[e] 
federalist structure of joint sovereigns . . . assures a decentralized government that will be more 
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society . . . .”); Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory 
of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 Duke L.J. 979, 980 (1993) (discussing 
“normative federalism” and the general agreement on the Court that “federalism exists for a 
purpose”); Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 Yale L.J. 947, 999 
(2001) (“[F]ederalism . . . promotes policy diversification and decentralization.”); Steven G. Calabresi, 
Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 24, 
26–29 (2001) (describing federalism as “constitutionally mandated decentralization” that promotes 
local preferences); Dennis M. Cariello, Federalism for the New Millennium: Accounting for the Values 
of Federalism, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1493, 1559 (1999) (“Federalism is theory of decentralization in 
government. As such, it shares a number of the economic benefits of decentralization.”); A.E. Dick 
Howard, Does Federalism Secure or Undermine Rights?, in Federalism and Rights 11–12 (Ellis Katz 
& G. Alan Tarr eds., 1996) (discussing some of the benefits and drawbacks of federalism); Larry D. 
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 
223 (2000) (“Federalism must be understood as . . . an institutional strategy formulated to assure a 
greater degree of decentralization than is ever likely to be seen in a unitary system.”); Michael W. 
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1491–1511 (1987) 
(presenting the intellectual case for federalism); John O. McGinnis, In Praise of the Efficiency of 
Decentralized Traditions and Their Preconditions, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 523, 526 (1999) 
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But just as the progressive localism of the 1980s and 1990s has been 
criticized for relying on formal legal categories and relatively abstract 
ideal terms in its positive descriptions and normative critiques of 
American local government law,142 so too has the neo-federalist version 
of localism.143 Professor Richard Briffault has convincingly argued that 
these claims—that local governments lack sufficient legal power—are 
based on black-letter law but do not reflect intergovernmental practice, 
and that the “new localists” tend to exaggerate the virtues of enhancing 
local government.144 As Briffault has shown, and as has increasingly been 
recognized in the literature, descriptive analysis of constraints placed on 
local power by legal regimes must be policy-specific and take into 
account the broader institutional setting.145 More recently, a small group 
of legal scholars—such as Briffault—have drawn more explicitly on 
developments in economics, history of economics, organizational theory, 
and management theory, to probe and address public policy, including 
questions involving the administration of civil rights that are generally 
not viewed in such terms.146 And in the private law area, Erica Gorga and 
the Author have argued for a “knowledge-based theory of the firm,” 
relying on similar sources as these “new institutionalists.”147 
The analysis of the VRA’s preclearance regime provided in Parts 
III.B and III.C attempts to provide the type of policy-specific contextual 
assessment of local autonomy under the VRA called for by Briffault. It 
reexamines the standard description of the constraints that the 
preclearance process is said to place on local power, accounts for the 
details of intergovernmental practices, considers concrete burdens and 
results, and compares the regime to other enforcement measures. In so 
doing, it also takes into account that institutions are practices and 
routines that fix power relations between individuals and groups but, 
importantly, also embody social techniques and learning. However 
fervent are the attempts at fixing such power relations, institutional 
 
(“[F]ederalism . . . was the Framers’ most important contribution to protecting decentralized 
traditionmaking.”); A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic 
Analysis of Tradition’s Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 409, 504 (1999) 
(“[D]iversity is part of the genius of federalism, which allows for . . . efficiency-enhancing 
decentralization . . . .”). 
 142. Briffault, supra note 140, at 1–2; see also Rodriguez, supra note 140, at 627–28. 
 143. See David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 Duke L.J. 377, 378–82 
(2001). 
 144. See Briffault, supra note 140, at 1–2. 
 145. Id. at 1–3; see also Barron, supra note 143, at 378–82; Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 
24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (2002) [hereinafter Cross, Folly of Federalism]; Frank B. Cross, Institutions 
and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1529 (2000) [hereinafter Cross, Institutions 
and Enforcement]. 
 146. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 26, at 323–39. 
 147. Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: 
Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1123, 1125–27 (2007). 
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change is constant and inevitable. The resulting disruption of both power 
relations and knowledge sets has been managed successfully by the 
design and implementation of the preclearance regime. 
B. Section 5 as a Learning/Monitoring Regime 
It is rarely observed that preclearance leaves the design of local 
election systems in the hands of state and local officials. State and local 
officials decide on voter registration qualifications, practices and 
procedures, what type of voting systems to adopt, how to district, where 
to locate polling places, and where to expand cities by annexing 
neighboring populations. So long as the new law, practice, or procedure 
does not violate the antidiscrimination standard, there is no substantive 
federal input. Decisions on election design remain in local hands.148 
Section 5’s liability rule is an open standard, not a categorical, one-
size-fits-all rule. It requires that the new laws that affect voting “neither 
ha[ve] the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color.”149 The standard does not 
specify what changes a state, county, or city should adopt. The practices 
and the standard itself have evolved to accommodate changing 
circumstances and changing conceptions and measures of vote 
discrimination. Section 5 is, therefore, nothing like the categorical, one-
size-fits-all rule of strict equality imposed by the one-person/one-vote 
cases,150 the universal ban on literacy tests,151 or the recently announced 
50% rule for majority-minority districts under section 2 of the VRA.152 It 
does not impose a fixed rule. 
The preclearance process promotes incremental change. Only new 
laws and practices must be precleared.153 Existing laws and practices are 
 
 148. To be sure, Congress has increasingly federalized election law by other means. In particular it 
passed the National Voter Registration Act in 1993, and the Help America Vote Act in 2002. These 
laws have imposed substantial requirements on states, issuing specific directives to adopt concrete 
practices and procedures, such as requiring automatic voter registration at all motor vehicle divisions, 
forcing states to accept a standardized federal voter registration form drafted by federal officials, 
forcing states to permit “provisional votes” at polling places, requiring them to create a “statewide 
computerized voter registration database,” and setting forth detailed requirements for the system 
(such as the requirement to “match” a voter registration applicant’s driver’s license number or last 
four digits of her social security number with those on file with the state DMV or the federal SSA, 
respectively). See generally Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (Supp. II 2002); 
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (Motor Voter Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10 (2006). 
The constitutionality of Congress’s power to impose these laws has never been seriously challenged, 
even though their burdens are huge by comparison. 
 149. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006). Prior to VRARA, section 5’s antidiscrimination standard read: 
“does not have the purpose and will not have the effect . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). 
 150. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 151. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117–18 (1970). 
 152. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1246 (2009); see also discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 153. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c); see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969). 
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not disrupted, either all at once or wholesale. Congress specified that the 
preclearance regime should reach only changes in voting qualifications, 
prerequisites, standards, practices or procedures.154 Existing law and 
practices are not subject to preclearance, even if they were established 
with discriminatory purpose and are retained with the intent to 
discriminate.155 Only a change will trigger section 5 preclearance review. 
Moreover, after Beer v. United States,156 the Attorney General may not 
object based on the effects prong to any vote changes that improve upon 
or replicate the status quo in a different form. Beer interprets the effects 
prong narrowly to prohibit only those vote changes that “would lead to a 
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their 
effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”157 The preclearance regime 
is, therefore, intrinsically gradualist and incrementalist. It tolerates 
variation and experimentation at the local levels—even below nationally 
accepted constitutional standards of racial vote discrimination. 
The standard account of preclearance is that Congress acted to 
prevent jurisdictions from circumventing judicial remedies to racial 
discrimination.158 Whereas section 2, authorizing civil rights actions, is 
called the “sword,” section 5 is called a “shield.”159 Instead of waiting for 
victims to bring civil rights actions for voter discrimination, only to have 
offending jurisdictions undo any judicial remedy by subsequently 
tinkering with other elements of a complex election system, section 5 
declared every election-related change presumptively discriminatory 
unless the jurisdiction satisfied its burden of proving that the new law 
had neither a discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory effect.160 In 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court thus explained that 
 
 154. § 1973(c). 
 155. Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 134 n.10 (1983) (clarifying that changes that are 
neither ameliorative nor retrogressive do not violate the section 5 effect standard). 
 156. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). 
 157. Id. at 141. 
 158. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Voting Rights Enforcement & Reauthorization: The 
Department of Justice’s Record of Enforcing the Temporary Voting Rights Act Provisions 2 
(2006) [hereinafter VRA Enforcement Record]. 
 159. See e.g., Heather K. Way, A Shield or a Sword? Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and the 
Argument for the Incorporation of Section 2, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1439, 1453–54 (1996). 
 160. See Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (“There is nothing illogical about 
creating a per se ban on certain presumptively discriminatory qualifications in ‘covered jurisdictions’ 
only . . . .”); Mark A. Posner, The Real Story Behind the Justice Department’s Implementation of 
Section 5 of the VRA: Vigorous Enforcement, as Intended by Congress, 1 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 79, 88 (2006) (“This reversal of the ordinary legal presumption is at the heart of the Section 5 
remedy.”). But the burden-shifting statute is not properly described as a legal presumption. 
Jurisdictions that seek preclearance from the DOJ bear the burden of proving that their voting 
changes are nondiscriminatory. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538–39 (1973) (upholding 
burden-shifting in administrative preclearance); see also Procedures for the Administration of Section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as Amended, 28 C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (2005).  
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Congress intended to “shift the advantage of time and inertia from the 
perpetrators of the evil to its victims.”161 
But the standard account is incomplete. Section 5 does not, in fact, 
“shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil 
to its victims.” It splits the difference. Time and inertia still work in favor 
of offending jurisdictions to the extent that the statute does not require 
jurisdictions to change their procedures. Covered jurisdictions can avoid 
preclearance for a time by refraining from vote changes.162 
Similarly, the section 5 effects test is not as “all-encompassing, 
stringent, unconditional, and uncompromising,” as is suggested.163 To 
pass muster under section 5, vote changes need not conform to uniform 
national standards or best practices. A vote change that is not 
purposefully discriminatory must be precleared if it does not make 
minorities worse off or “retrogress.”164 For example, a districting plan 
that merely retains the number of majority-minority districts but does 
not draw additional ones does not necessarily violate section 5, even if it 
does not afford minorities proportional representation in the legislature. 
An attorney in the DOJ’s Voting Section once put it this way: “If a 
change makes something better, we’re not supposed to object even if it is 
still not very good.”165 
Objections by the DOJ have predominately based on retrogressive 
effect (or on a combination of retrogression and other bases).166 But 
critics have suggested that the DOJ’s increased reliance on 
discriminatory intent during the 1980s and 1990s was used to impose 
 
 161. 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966). 
 162. Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial and 
Language Minorities, in Quiet Revolution, supra note 4, at 21, 33; see also Ball et al., supra note 27, 
at 179 (During the 1970s and early 1980s, “many counties . . . simply ignored the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act by not modifying their election laws or procedures.”). The requirement of reapportionment in 
accordance with the decennial census and other legal and internal exigencies of the electoral process 
place limits on such a strategy of delay. Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After 
the 2000 Census, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 731, 733–34 (1998). Furthermore, successful lawsuits against 
minority vote discrimination under section 2 force changes that are later subject to preclearance. 
Nonetheless, preclearance has been avoided for decades in certain cases. See, e.g., Bartlett v. 
Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1239 (2009) (considering the “whole county” provision). 
 163. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320, 363 (2000) (Souter, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 164. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (“[T]he purpose of § 5 has always been to 
insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the 
position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”). 
 165. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 88 (citing the Hunter interview). 
 166. Posner, supra note 160, at 108 & tbl.2. Posner notes that “[a] small percentage (about nine 
percent) of the retrogression objections interposed in the 1980s were based on the analysis developed” 
in Wilkes County v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1171, 1174–76 (D.D.C. 1978), aff’d mem., 439 U.S. 999 
(1978). Posner, supra note 160, at 108 n.92. The Wilkes test, however, “did not measure whether 
minority voters in fact would be worse off . . . .” Id. 
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rigid federal requirements on state and local jurisdictions.167 
Nevertheless, persuasive arguments have been advanced to suggest that 
the DOJ has been quite flexible and much less intrusive than generally 
presumed in its enforcement of both the purpose and the effects prongs 
of the section 5 standard.168 For example, the DOJ interposed objections 
to over 150 redistricting plans based on discriminatory purpose during 
the 1990s. But these objections rested on an interpretation of the purpose 
standard that required jurisdictions to provide specific evidence of non-
discriminatory purpose, where a “plan substantially minimized minority 
voting strength, and that minimization was not required by adherence to 
traditional race-neutral districting principles . . . .”169 In other words, the 
Attorney General would defer to, and prioritize, traditional race-neutral 
justifications for drawing district lines—even in cases where the 
districting plans minimized minority voting strength. Only where the 
justification of district boundaries—in terms of incumbency protection, 
preserving political subdivisions, geographic compactness, contiguity, 
representation of communities of interest, and so on—could not explain 
why a jurisdiction had minimized minority voting strength, did the DOJ 
insist on further explanation. 
Critics complained of this use of section 5 as a tool of affirmative 
action.170 But, affirmative action is associated with quotas that are 
privileged over—or at least valued the same as—other legitimate 
considerations in admissions or hiring, among others. Here, 
nonretrogressive changes that minimized minority voting strength would 
not prompt an objection under the purpose prong, so long as those 
changes could be accounted for reasonably. Consistent with this 
approach, the DOJ relied on discriminatory purpose under a few other 
circumstances that, in its eyes, delegitimized a jurisdiction’s 
nonretrogressive voting change and thus raised questions of intent. The 
 
 167. See Maurice T. Cunningham, Maximization, Whatever the Cost: Race, Redistricting, and 
the Department of Justice 68 (2000) (“Whereas the DOJ had a history of seeking moderately 
progressive legal interpretations, in the nineties it transformed purpose and Gingles in order to push 
and defend maximization.”); see also id. at 119–40. 
 168. See generally Voting Rights Act: Section 5—Preclearance Standards: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. app. at 96–181 (2005) 
[hereinafter Preclearance Hearing] (prepared testimony of Peyton McCrary et al.); Peyton McCrary et 
al., The End of Preclearance as We Knew It: How the Supreme Court Transformed Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act, 11 Mich. J. Race & L. 275 (2006); Mark A. Posner, Post-1990 Redistrictings and the 
Preclearance Requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in Race and Redistricting in the 
1990s, at 80, 96–98 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998); Posner, supra note 160, at 84; James P. Turner, Case-
Specific Implementation of the Voting Rights Act, in Controversies in Minority Voting, supra note 
34, at 296–99. The authors cited here have all been longtime career staff with the DOJ’s Voting 
Section. 
 169. Posner, supra note 160, at 145; Posner, supra note 168, at 101. 
 170. See, e.g., Thernstrom, supra note 37, at 27 (stating that section 5 has been wrongfully turned 
“into an instrument for affirmative action in the electoral sphere”). 
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controversy surrounding the DOJ’s resort to section 5’s discriminatory 
intent standard is taken up below. 
The preclearance regime was designed to address regional and local 
variation in other fundamental ways. The VRA’s unusual coverage 
provision singled out the worst offenders by keying coverage to the 
abuse of literacy or moral character tests used to keep blacks off the rolls 
and to the resulting very low registration rates.171 Southern states 
complained that “the coverage formula . . . disregard[ed] various local 
conditions which have nothing to do with racial discrimination.”172 The 
fact that some Southern states, like Florida, were not covered in their 
entirety weakens this criticism. Moreover, additional jurisdictions would 
become subject to preclearance based on the trigger. Indeed, the 
coverage provision was later amended to include discrimination against 
minority language groups. Finally, a bailout provision allowed 
jurisdictions to apply for termination of coverage under section 5, if they 
could prove they had not engaged in racial vote discrimination.173 
The DOJ’s preclearance procedures developed to accommodate 
local variation in exchange for local jurisdictions’ agreement to share 
information with the federal agency.174 The implementation of 
preclearance occurred against the background of significant resistance 
and defiance by covered jurisdictions and a severely understaffed Voting 
Section at the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division (“CRD”).175 The CRD 
responded with an enforcement process that rested heavily on informal 
exchange, negotiation, and compromise between local governments, the 
CRD staff, and the minority groups and representatives who were most 
affected by vote changes.176 This approach has been partially credited for 
the steady increase of submissions, following the first publication of 
submissions guidelines in 1971.177 Hugh Graham, who has studied the 
evolution of administrative agencies during this period concluded that 
the “CRD never treated the South like Hugo Black’s feared ‘conquered 
province.’ Instead, it pre-cleared 95 percent of the 35,000 proposed 
electoral changes [as of 1982], objected to only 2.3 percent, and litigated 
only 240 of the most intractable cases.”178 
 
 171. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 329–34 (1966). 
 172. Id. at 329. 
 173. Relatively few jurisdictions took advantage of this provision. See generally Hebert, supra note 
90; Herbert, supra note 96. 
 174. This is one of the features that characterize “democratic experimentalist” institutions, 
according to Dorf and Sabel. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 26, at 438–44. 
 175. See Ball et al., supra note 27, at 201–02. 
 176. Id. at 74–78. 
 177. VRA Enforcement Record, supra note 158. 
 178. Hugh Graham, Book Review, 49 J. S. Hist. 145, 146 (1983) (reviewing Ball et al., supra note 
27). 
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Commentators have argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
City of Richmond and Beer endorsed and validated the CRD’s emerging 
case-specific and flexible administrative process.179 This is consistent with 
criticisms that the preclearance process and the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in City of Richmond and Beer failed to implement Congress’s 
“stringent, unconditional, and uncompromising” section 5 standard as 
intended.180 Because, under Beer, the DOJ’s review is based on 
comparing vote changes to the state or local status quo, the DOJ’s 
enforcement of section 5 has necessarily continued to be case-specific: 
Under section 5, “a practice that is legal and proper in one jurisdiction 
may be illegal and improper in another . . . .”181 
As discussed above, the DOJ’s power to object has been criticized 
as akin to giving the federal government a veto, or permitting it to strike 
down a state or local law, without having to bring a lawsuit. But this 
analogy is misleading. There is no finding of liability under the 
preclearance regime. If the DOJ fails to object within sixty days of the 
receipt of a submission, the change of law goes into effect. The ultimate 
“remedy,” an objection by the Attorney General, is to send the 
jurisdiction back to the drawing board. The DOJ has no power to craft 
and impose a particular solution on state or local jurisdictions, as does a 
court in a section 2 case.182 If a jurisdiction refuses to comply, the DOJ 
must still go to court to obtain an injunction.183 Initially, the DOJ did not 
even focus on following up to determine whether jurisdictions 
implemented changes that had been denied preclearance.184 Given the 
very low number of objections—less than 1% of submissions on 
average—the principal imposition on covered jurisdictions is the 
requirement that they create and produce the information demanded by 
 
 179. See infra notes 275–95 for a fuller discussion. 
 180. See, e.g., Ball et al., supra note 27 (arguing that the DOJ implemented a regime that 
“compromised compliance”); Karlan, supra note 3 (deploring the increasingly lenient interpretation 
given to section 5’s standard by the U.S. Supreme Court). But see Posner, supra note 160, at 124. 
(rejecting Ball’s thesis of “compromised compliance” without, however, specifically addressing 
evidence marshaled by Ball and his co-authors). While different in emphasis, I do not believe that 
Posner’s showing is inconsistent with Ball’s interpretation of the CRD’s implementation of 
administrative preclearance. 
 181. Turner, supra note 168, at 297; see also Posner, supra note 160, at 127; Posner, supra note 168. 
 182. To be sure, courts that enter a finding of liability are first required to let the offending 
jurisdiction come up with an alternative. Williams v. City of Texarkana, 32 F.3d 1265, 1268 (8th Cir. 
1994) (citing Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978)). But judicial remedies are not infrequent 
under section 2. See generally Katz, supra note 4. 
 183. See, e.g., Drew S. Days, Section 5 and the Justice Department, in Controversies in Minority 
Voting, supra note 34, at 63 n.45. (citing United States v. City of Houston, C.A. No. 78-4-2407 (S.D. 
Tex. July 19, 1979)). 
 184. As of 1978, the Attorney General had objected to 257 of the reported 13,433 submissions 
between 1965 and 1976 but had yet to initiate any formal compliance reviews. U.S. Gen. Accounting 
Office, Voting Rights Act—Enforcement Needs Strengthening 17 (1978); Days, supra note 184, at 
64. 
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the submissions guidelines and any required follow-up requests for 
information by the Voting Section staff.185 
Preclearance requires covered jurisdictions to continuously report 
all changes in voting-related laws, practices, and procedures, even if no 
complaints have been received by the DOJ and no law suits have been 
filed in the courts. If the Voting Section is not persuaded that a vote 
change “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or 
membership in a language minority group,” it may either object or seek 
further information from the jurisdiction (so-called More Information 
Requests, or “MIR”).186 Objections, as already stated, are rare; MIRs are 
more common.187 
For these reasons, preclearance has functioned, for the most part, as 
a monitoring regime. But, preclearance has not been toothless. 
Participants in the process have pointed out that “a denial of 
preclearance may result in overturning actions a jurisdiction has already 
taken or in suspending changes such as annexations and bond elections 
that have enormous economic consequences. At the very least, a denial 
may promise lengthy and expensive litigation.”188 But section 5 does not 
impose additional burdens or legal requirements on jurisdictions.189 A 
federal antidiscrimination norm already applies nationwide to all 
jurisdictions under section 2 of the VRA and under the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.190 Section 5 
does not go beyond what is substantively already required of states and 
localities. To the contrary, in making preclearance decisions, the DOJ 
was forced to tolerate unconstitutional and, under Bossier Parish II, even 
intentional discrimination, so long as it did not make minorities worse 
 
 185. Contrast that with the significant success rates for plaintiffs in voting rights litigation. A recent 
study by Professor Katz finds that:  
  Electoral practices implemented by counties in covered jurisdictions have been most 
vulnerable to challenge under Section 2, with plaintiffs obtaining favorable outcomes in 
55.3% of the suits against county practices since 1982. Practices adopted by schools and by 
states as a whole, in covered and noncovered jurisdictions alike, have been more resilient, 
with plaintiffs succeeding in 28.6% of the lawsuits brought against these entities. 
Katz, supra note 4, at 190–91. These numbers do not include settlements; nor do they include 
withdrawals. Id. 
 186. 28 C.F.R. § 51.1 (2010); id. § 51.37(a). 
 187. Luis Ricardo Fraga & Maria Lizet Ocampo, More Information Requests and the Deterrent 
Effect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006, supra 
note 4, at 47, 60 tbl.3.2 (identifying 2282 objections relative to 387,673 submitted changes but 13,697 
MIRs). 
 188. Days, supra note 184, at 61; see also Posner, supra note 168. 
 189. Posner, supra note 168. 
 190. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973 (2006)); see also U.S. Const. amend XIV; U.S. Const. amend XV. 
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off.191 Section 5, as the Supreme Court has stated on several occasions, is 
therefore less burdensome than the Constitution itself.192 Neither 
objections based on the retrogression prong,193 nor the purpose prong,194 
imposed requirements that exceeded what the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments already demanded. In any case, the application of the 
purpose standard in the administrative preclearance process, is 
necessarily much less burdensome to jurisdictions than litigating the 
matter. 
In sum, preclearance has operated as a regime of forced disclosure, 
or “information-pushing.”195 Every election-related change in the law, or 
in practices and procedures must be precleared.196 Depending on how 
one counts, there have been over 117,000 submissions between 1965 and 
2004, or 435,000 reviews of voting changes between 1965 and 2006.197 For 
each vote change, covered jurisdictions must make detailed submissions 
that are standardized to the requirements of the DOJ guidelines. 
Covered jurisdictions must submit detailed information concerning vote 
changes, including a copy of the ordinance, enactment, or order; 
information concerning the authority enacting the change; an 
explanation of the change, including its date, scope, the reasons for the 
change, and its impact on minority groups; and a statement of past or 
pending litigation concerning the change or related voting practices.198 If 
the change is more complex, involving redistricting, annexations, or other 
complex changes, additional information is required—including 
demographic information based on U.S. Census data, the number of 
registered voters for affected areas, estimates of population, census block 
data for redistricting, maps, data on election returns, information on 
publicity of the changes and participation by local groups in the decision 
process, and any other information required by the DOJ to make its 
assessment.199 
Information on thousands of jurisdictions is kept in databases at the 
DOJ.200 The detailed submissions are public and are made available to 
 
 191. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320, 340 (2000) (weakening the 
concept of discriminatory intent under section 5 by requiring that an objection must be founded on 
“retrogressive intent,” instead of the stricter constitutional standard set forth in Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977)); McCrary et al., 
supra note 168, at 288–89. 
 192. See, e.g., Veith v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 286 (2004). 
 193. See discussion infra notes 284–94 and accompanying text. 
 194. See discussion infra notes 369–96 and accompanying text.  
 195. The term “information-pushing” was suggested to me by Pam Karlan. 
 196. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566 (1969). 
 197. VRA Enforcement Record, supra note 158, at 26. 
 198. 28 C.F.R. § 51.27 (2010). 
 199. Id. § 51.28. 
 200. Id. § 51.50 (pertaining to maintenance of records concerning submissions). 
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local politicians, minority representatives, and civil rights groups as a 
matter of course, as well as to anyone else who requests the 
information.201 Governmental and nongovernmental actors routinely 
access the DOJ’s current and historical information on election law 
changes in covered jurisdictions.202 The information is current and 
accurate, because the change of law at issue is described and takes effect 
only after it is precleared.203 If, upon review, the DOJ is unsatisfied with 
the proffered explanation of the change, it will ask for supplementation 
of the file.204 Preclearance submissions produce usable information, 
because they are standardized to the requirements set forth by the DOJ 
in the guidelines.205 
The contrast with litigation is instructive. A lawsuit enforcing the 
prohibition against racial vote dilution under section 2 of the VRA 
typically produces a voluminous and detailed historical record.206 But it 
takes years to develop that record in the context of a judicial proceeding. 
By the time the lawsuit is over, the situation on the ground often has 
changed. More importantly, such lawsuits are brought only where a 
violation is strong enough to justify the considerable investment required 
to bring a case. There are relatively few organizations that engage in such 
litigation and their resources are limited.207 Katz’s study of section 2 cases 
 
 201. Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
28 C.F.R. §§ 51.32–.33, 51.36, 51.38, 51.45 (2010). 
 202. Id. § 51.50. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. §§ 51.37, 51.39. 
 205. Note that the current regulations also require that “submissions should be no longer than is 
necessary for the presentation of the appropriate information and materials.” See 28 C.F.R. § 51.26 
(2010). 
 206. Notwithstanding the simplification of vote dilution claims under section 2 by Thornburg v. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), plaintiffs in such cases will make voluminous factual submissions to satisfy 
their burden under the totality of circumstances test further specified by the factors listed in the Senate 
Report to the 1982 amendments of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which were originally distilled 
from case law, specifically White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 
1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc). See Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and 
Minority Representation, in Controversies in Minority Voting, supra note 34, at 68; see also 
Issacharoff et al., supra note 62, at 543. In Thornburg v. Gingles, for example, the factual record 
before the court supported the court’s finding under  
the totality of the circumstances . . . that in each district racially polarized voting; the legacy 
of official discrimination in voting matters, education, housing, employment, and health 
services; and the persistence of campaign appeals to racial prejudice acted in concert with 
the multimember districting scheme to impair the ability of geographically insular and 
politically cohesive groups of black voters to participate equally in the political process and 
to elect candidates of their choice. 
478 U.S. at 80. 
 207. Most cases are brought by a limited number of civil rights groups. See generally Gregory A. 
Caldeira, Litigation, Lobbying, and the Voting Rights Bar, in Controversies in Minority Voting, 
supra note 34, 230–57 (arguing that “litigation on voting rights has developed into something of a 
cottage industry,” but construing the emerging “voting rights bar” broadly to include non-litigators, 
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identified 331 lawsuits, encompassing 763 decisions, since the passage of 
the 1982 amendments authorized disparate impact claims under section 
2.208 Contrast that with the DOJ’s almost 320,000 voting changes 
processed since 1982.209 
Preclearance has taken the form of a relatively informal process of 
advisement, assistance, and negotiation between local government 
officials and the DOJ on the one hand, and between minority 
representatives and (federal and local) public officials on the other hand. 
The process promotes learning at several levels, even as it has involved 
varying degrees of political and intergovernmental conflict that 
occasionally must be settled in Court. 
This submission process creates a constant intergovernmental 
information exchange regarding thousands of changes in local law or 
election procedure each year. DOJ experts analyze the submissions and 
communicate about changes with local officials. As already mentioned, 
the regulations include record keeping requirements that ensure access 
to current and historical information for each of thousands of covered 
jurisdictions about every “ordinance, enactment, order, or regulation 
embodying a voting practice that [was] proposed to be repealed, 
amended, or otherwise changed.”210 The material is accessible to 
government officials, to local minority groups, national civil rights 
organizations, minority representatives and office holders, and the 
general public. More recently, the regulations have provided for 
electronic submissions and standardized electronic coding of 
demographic data, maps, census blocks, and so forth, increasingly 
rendering this information electronically searchable.211 
The information exchange is a two-way street. Local officials seek 
guidance from the DOJ about filing submissions, what changes might 
 
and discussing throughout a small number of “well-established institutions” who have been repeat 
players in voting rights litigation, such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the ACLU National 
Voting Rights Project, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and the Laywers’ 
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law). Additional institutions, such as The Advancement Project 
and the Brennan Center for Justice, among others, have recently joined this group.  
 208. According to Katz’s estimate (based on interpolation from the ACLU’s data concerning 
section 2 cases brought in Georgia), more than 1600 section 2 cases have been filed nationwide during 
that period, 800 of them in covered jurisdictions. Katz et al., supra note 4, at 654. Katz also notes, 
Of the total number of cases filed, some plaintiffs failed to pursue their claims, some 
obtained relief through settlement, and others saw their cases go to judgment, but the courts 
involved did not issue any published opinion or ancillary ruling published on the electronic 
databases surveyed. The total number of claims filed under Section 2 since the 1982 
amendment is, accordingly, not known. 
Id. 
 209. VRA Enforcement Record, supra note 157, at 31 tbl.A3. 
 210. 28 C.F.R. § 51.27(b) (2010). 
 211. Id. § 51.20. 
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raise concerns, and how to comply with the preclearance procedures.212 
DOJ staffers respond by applying precedent from prior preclearance 
decisions by the federal courts and the DOJ.213 The requirement to 
submit by use of a standardized form, in turn, forces submitting 
jurisdictions to consider the federal antidiscrimination norm in their 
decision process. This happens at every level of government, because 
local jurisdictions must submit directly to the DOJ. Moreover, at least as 
important as the assessment itself, it forces the jurisdiction to put 
together the information in a manner that permits such consideration in 
the first place.214 
The regulations also encourage local jurisdictions to consult and 
involve local minority representatives in the preclearance process. For 
important or controversial changes, jurisdictions must provide evidence 
that the public has been notified of the changes, that residents have had 
the opportunity to be heard about the changes, and about the extent of 
minority participation in the decision process.215 This encourages local 
officials to consult and engage with minority representatives at the local 
level and to negotiate with them. The case of Georgia v. Ashcroft is 
perhaps exemplary in showing how significant participation by minorities 
in the decision process might be deemed more important than DOJ 
expert reports in determining whether to preclear complicated and far-
reaching changes.216 In Ashcroft, the Supreme Court based its decision to 
reject the DOJ’s objections to Georgia’s post-2000 redistricting plan on 
the extensive input and participation of black legislatures in devising and 
approving the plan. In so doing, the Court privileged minority 
participation in the decisionmaking process at the state level over an 
 
 212. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 146. 
 213. 28 CFR §§ 51.52, 51.54–.57 (2010). See generally Preclearance Hearing, supra note 168, app. at 
109–69 (prepared testimony of Peyton McCrary et al.); see also id. at 8 (testimony of Mark A. Posner, 
Professor, Am. Univ.) (“The [Justice] Department utilized the well-established framework for 
conducting discriminatory purpose analyses set forth by the Supreme Court in the Arlington Heights 
case and also relied on the analytic factors described in the Department’s procedures for the 
administration of section 5.”). 
 214. Ball and his co-authors note:  
The importance of initial campaigns to educate subnational officials should not be 
overlooked. . . . [It is a key to creating] a common language . . . . [T]he content of 
submissions, the form of communications from local groups, and the basic appeal routes 
were specified. Such elementary steps often seem rather simple when compared to grander 
events like a pivotal Supreme Court case . . . or a long-running enforcement struggle . . . but 
without a standard linguistic code and standard operational procedures, neither the 
negotiations necessary for inducing compliance nor the procedural fairness necessary for 
ensuring obedience can be achieved. 
Ball et al., supra note 27, at 117. 
 215. 28 C.F.R. § 50.7-(7) (1971); see also 28 C.F.R. § 51.28 (2010); 28 C.F.R. § 51.28 (1987). 
 216. 539 U.S. 461, 469–72 (2003). 
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objective test for retrogression in the redistricting context that had 
previously been applied by the courts.217 
The regulations also required submissions to identify and include 
contact information for individuals of minority groups residing in the 
affected areas “who can be expected to be familiar with the proposed 
change or who have been active in the political process.”218 The DOJ 
maintained a file with contact information for local and regional minority 
representatives, minority leaders, and civil rights organizations.219 
Finally, the preclearance regime has relied heavily on enlisting local 
knowledge in the various ways described above. Instead of overriding 
local preferences, choices remain in local hands. Changes are identified 
and justified by local officials, who are charged with getting input at the 
local level from affected minorities. Self-interested local minority 
representatives and civil rights groups are relied upon at various stages in 
the process: to comment at the local level on the effects of the changes 
before their adoption, to flag problematic changes for the Voting Section 
staff, to raise objections with the Voting Section, and to contribute 
information on the effects of submissions during the review process.220 In 
addition, they help identify unreported changes, which would otherwise 
go unnoticed.221 
C. Phases of Implementation 
It is helpful to consider these features of the preclearance regime in 
connection with the different phases of the VRA’s implementation. The 
following distinguishes five phases: (1) the focus on registration during 
the 1960s, (2) the implementation of preclearance as a process of 
bargaining and compromise in the 1970s, (3) the relative impact of 
litigation and the evolution of vote dilution claims during the 1970s and 
1980s, (4) the focus on redistricting during the 1990s and the Supreme 
Court’s Shaw jurisprudence, and (5) the evolution of the nonretrogression 
standard during the post-Shaw period. 
1. The Focus on Registration During the 1960s 
The first phase focused on voter registration in the South. The VRA 
mandated that literacy tests and poll taxes be abolished in covered 
jurisdictions and gave the Attorney General the authority to send federal 
 
 217. Id.; see discussion infra notes 406–26 and accompanying text. 
 218. 28 C.F.R. § 51.28 (2010). 
 219. See infra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 220. See, e.g., infra notes 402–03 and accompanying text for criticism of the DOJ’s Voting Section 
for relying too heavily on civil rights groups in this process. 
 221. The reliance on local minority groups has led to arguments of administrative capture. See 
Cunningham, supra note 167, at 94–97. 
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marshals and examiners or observers to covered jurisdictions.222 During 
the 1960s, black voter registration ratios rose from 29% to 60% as a 
result of these and other factors.223 Both the elimination of literacy tests 
and the dispatch of county-level federal examiners had a significant 
impact.224 
That initial phase, which involved a significant and direct 
interference with the police powers of covered jurisdictions, came to an 
end in the late 1960s.225 Faced with attempts to roll back gains in black 
registration by instituting re-registration programs in the late 1960s, the 
DOJ began to focus on section 5, which had been enacted to preclude 
precisely these attempts at undermining progress in minority vote 
discrimination. 
2. The Implementation of the Preclearance Regime as a Process of 
Bargaining and Compromise in the 1970s 
Compliance with preclearance was sporadic in the late 1960s. There 
was uncertainty about what changes were subject to preclearance until 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Allen v. State Board of Elections that 
section 5 reached a broad range of election-related changes, including 
racial vote dilution.226 Allen changed the situation dramatically. Allen 
involved the change to at-large elections of all county boards of 
supervisors and boards of election in Mississippi.227 The changes 
threatened to significantly dilute black voting strength.228 Voting rights 
activists brought suit, arguing that these changes were subject to 
preclearance.229 The Supreme Court ultimately agreed, holding that the 
VRA “gives a broad interpretation to the right to vote, recognizing that 
voting includes ‘all action necessary to make a vote effective.’”230 Not 
merely registration procedures, but all laws affecting voting would 
thereafter require preclearance, including annexations, districting, and 
the use of at-large voting to dilute minority voting strength.231 
 
 222. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-110, §§ 4, 6, 79 Stat. 437, 438–40 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)). 
 223. Davidson & Grofman, supra note 4, at 366. 
 224. Id. at 367. 
 225. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 73. 
 226. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
 227. Id. at 550. 
 228. Davidson, supra note 162, at 32. 
 229. Allen, 393 U.S. at 554. 
 230. Id. at 565–66 (quoting Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-110, § 4(c)(2), 79 Stat. 437, 
439 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (1964 & Supp I)). 
 231. See supra text accompanying note 68. See generally Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 502 
U.S. 491, 502–03 (1992); Allen, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Ball et al., supra note 27, at 19, 66–67. 
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In 1970, Congress renewed section 5.232 In 1971, the DOJ published 
guidelines that detailed the submission requirements and process.233 
Submissions increased substantially from 1542 between 1965 and 1974, to 
13,874 between 1975 and 1981, even as the percentage of objections fell 
steeply during the same periods (from 14.2% to 3.1%).234 
Preclearance had to be initiated in a context of conflict, mistrust, 
and absence of respect between federal and state actors.235 The DOJ’s 
CRD did not have enough staff to fully review all the vote changes.236 
Lacking judicial powers, the CRD had to seek injunctions in court to 
force a submission or enforce an objection. And it did not have the 
capability to identify voting changes down to the county, city, and school 
board levels for thousands of jurisdictions in the first place.237 The CRD 
depended on the regulated entities to come forward and participate in 
the compliance process voluntarily and on assistance from increasingly 
important civil rights organizations.238 In the face these challenges, the 
DOJ adopted a more flexible strategy of information exchange and 
negotiation. In the words of one DOJ official, the CRD handled 
submissions by “establishing a mutually acceptable set of objectives and 
values and accommodating these to the solution of the problems of 
different political constituencies.”239 
A study by Howard Ball, Dale Krane, and Thomas P. Lauth 
documents that the CRD assumed the role of mediator and educator: 
  In order to elicit compliance, the Voting Section had to overcome its 
inherent administrative weaknesses and had to build working 
relationships with southern election officials and southern civil rights 
leaders. Ultimately, to prevent the racial conflict from swamping its 
limited regulatory capacities, the only feasible approach to 
enforcement rested on the ability and ingenuity of the CRD attorneys 
 
 232. VRA Enforcement Record, supra note 158, at 2. 
 233. See discussion infra note 241. 
 234. VRA Enforcement Record, supra note 158, at 26 tbl.4 (periods correspond to legislative 
changes). 
 235. See Ball et al., supra note 27, at 115. 
 236. See id. at 116–17; VRA Enforcement Record, supra note 158, at 24 (“The Justice Department 
does not have the capacity to monitor all the covered jurisdictions to ensure that all voting changes are 
precleared prior to implementation.”). Jurisdictions originally covered by the 1965 Act  
include[d] approximately 550 counties and several thousand cities, towns, villages, and other 
special districts. From the viewpoint of the Voting Section, the logistics of enforcement pose 
a nearly insurmountable task because the relatively small staff of the Submission Unit 
located in Washington, D.C., must monitor the actions of elected officials (in often isolated 
communities) throughout the Deep South without the aid of their own field personnel. 
Ball et al., supra note 27, at 80–81. 
 237. Days, supra note 184, at 60–61. In spite of computerization, even today the identification of 
changes is not a straightforward matter because of the decentralization of the election system. 
 238. See Lorn S. Foster, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Implementation of an Administrative 
Remedy, 16 Publius: J. Federalism 17, 23 (1986). 
 239. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 116 (internal citations omitted). 
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to bring together the local contenders and to strike a bargained voting 
change between the two sides, which could then be “precleared” by the 
Attorney General. Despite its poverty of compliance-inducing 
resources, the Voting Section has been able to develop and implement 
such a bargaining strategy.240 
The negotiation strategy of the CRD is evidenced by the 1971 
regulations.241 The regulations forced information sharing between, and 
participation by, local jurisdictions, the DOJ, affected minorities, and 
their local representatives.242 Submissions were to include “evidence of 
public notice, of opportunity for the public to be heard[.]”243 The 
regulations strongly encouraged submission of newspaper articles, 
broadcast and television notices, minutes of public meetings or hearings, 
and pertinent minority group contacts.244 In considering submissions, 
“substantial weight” would be given  
to evidence of public notice or, where appropriate, opportunity for 
interested parties to participate in the decision to adopt or implement 
the proposed change and to indications that such participation in fact 
took place or to evidence of notice to the public that a submission has 
been made soliciting comment to the Department of Justice.245 
In effect, the administrative agency outsourced part of the administrative 
process to local jurisdictions. The study concluded that “[d]espite the 
resistance of die-hard segregationists and the absence of financial 
incentives of most other federal programs, voting rights policy 
implementation has tended to be a form of intergovernmental relations 
and interorganizational communications characterized more by 
cooperation than conflict.”246 Even as Drew Days rejected the study’s 
suggestion “that the Justice Department negotiate[d] with covered 
jurisdictions from a position of weakness,” he admitted that “[t]he 
department’s response to the technical-legal problems [of monitoring 
and compliance] has been to rely primarily on negotiation with 
submitting jurisdictions rather than on coercive measures.”247 
 
 240. Id. 
 241. The proposed guidelines were first published for comment in the Federal Register. 
Administration of Voting Rights Act of 1965, 36 Fed. Reg. 9781 (May 28, 1971). They were then 
published in final form and have been codified since 1972. Procedures for the Administration of 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 36 Fed. Reg. 18186 (Sept. 10, 1971) (codified at 28 C.F.R 
pt. 51 (1972)). The regulations governing the preclearance process have not changed significantly since 
the original codification. See 28 C.F.R pt. 51 (2010). 
 242. 28 C.F.R. pt. 51; Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, 36 Fed. Reg. at 18186; Administration of Voting Rights Act of 1965, 36 Fed. Reg. at 9781. 
 243. 28 C.F.R. § 51.28(f) (2010); Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, 36 Fed. Reg. at 18186; Administration of Voting Rights Act of 1965, 36 Fed. Reg. 
at 9781. 
 244. 28 C.F.R. § 51.28(f). 
 245. 28 C.F.R. § 50.7-(7) (1971); see also 28 C.F.R. § 51.28(f) (2010); 28 C.F.R. § 51.28 (1987). 
 246. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 28–29. 
 247. Days, supra note 184, at 61. 
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A covered jurisdiction was required to submit to the CRD the law it 
sought to repeal or amend, together with a statement of the reasons for 
the change.248 An explanation of the difference between the submitted 
change and the existing law or practice was required, including a 
statement of the anticipated effect of the change on members of racial or 
minority groups.249 Pending litigation relating to the change must be 
disclosed.250 Redistrictings, annexations, and other boundary changes 
required additional demographic information on how the proposal would 
change the boundaries of the voting unit or units and details concerning 
the effects this would have on the total and voting-age population by race 
and language group.251 The submission of additional information might 
be required in response to MIRs from the Voting Section’s attorneys. As 
part of the review process, the developed submission file was made 
available to local interest groups and politicians for input.252 All these 
provisions are substantially retained in the current version of the 
guidelines.253 
Separately, the regulations have explicitly required the Voting 
Section to obtain information from local minorities and civil rights 
groups through unofficial channels of communication.254 The submitting 
jurisdiction has had to identify and include contact information for 
individuals of minority groups residing in the affected areas “who can be 
expected to be familiar with the proposed change or who have been 
active in the political process.”255 Such informants have been encouraged 
directly by Voting Section staff to submit information not only 
concerning pending submissions, but also concerning vote changes that 
have not been reported to the Voting Section.256 
The following is a description of the section 5 review process by 
Mark Posner, who was an attorney with the CRD from 1980 to 2003: 
  Because the Justice Department must review submitted changes 
within a limited time period, the Department utilizes a relatively 
informal process for conducting the Section 5 reviews. As specified in 
the Procedures for the Administration of Section 5, jurisdictions 
initiate the administrative process by sending a letter to the Voting 
Section identifying the voting changes at issue and providing certain 
background data and documentation. The Section then conducts a 
factual investigation by examining the written information provided by 
the jurisdiction and requesting additional written information from the 
 
 248. 28 C.F.R. § 50.7-(10) (1971). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. § 50.7. 
 253. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 (2010). 
 254. 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (1971); 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. D (2010). 
 255. 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (1971); 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. D (2010).  
 256. 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (1971); 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. D (2010).  
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jurisdiction when appropriate, reviewing any written information 
provided by others, speaking on the telephone with the jurisdiction’s 
representatives and with minority contacts and other interested 
citizens, occasionally conducting an in-person meeting in Washington, 
D.C. with the jurisdiction’s representatives or separately with other 
interested individuals, and considering information on file with the 
Section (such as census data or information located in old submission 
files).257 
Such ex parte communications would, of course, be prohibited in judicial 
proceedings. The informality of the review process was also in other 
respects very different from a judicial proceeding and more like 
alternative dispute resolution: 
  The Department does not conduct formal or informal hearings, does 
not require or encourage the presentation of testimony under oath 
through affidavits or declarations, and does not have the authority to 
subpoena documents. The Department also does not apply the Federal 
Rules of Evidence to the information received during the course of its 
reviews.258 
 The CRD’s strategy of informal negotiation and compromise in 
exchange for cooperative disclosure emerged in the context of significant 
pressure on the DOJ by the Nixon administration, which sought to kill 
the VRA.259 Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” involved withdrawing federal 
officials from the South.260 The new Attorney General, John Mitchell, 
insisted that the CRD limit its objections under section 5 to only those 
instances in which it saw clear cases of racial discrimination.261 Civil rights 
lawyers believed that during the early years of the Nixon administration, 
the CRD’s actual practices removed the burden on submitting 
jurisdictions by requiring that either the department or interested private 
parties develop evidence that the proposed change would be iniquitous 
to blacks.262 
Voting rights supporters and independent observers viewed the 
process that emerged as one of “compromised compliance,” in which the 
CRD settled for “suboptimal levels of compliance.”263 Drew Days, who 
served as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights under President 
Carter from 1977 to 1980, and as President Clinton’s Solicitor General 
from 1993 to 1996, conceded that the Voting Section largely relied on 
 
 257. Posner assisted in supervising the CRD’s section 5 preclearance review from the mid-1980s to 
1995. Mark A. Posner, The Politicization of Justice Department Decisionmaking Under Section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act: Is It a Problem and What Should Congress Do? 9 (2006). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 67–70. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. David Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, at 198 (1978). 
 263. See generally Ball et al., supra note 27. 
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voluntary compliance by covered jurisdictions, even as it prosecuted a 
number of significant voting changes.264 
Several other factors, some at cross-purposes, contributed to the 
CRD’s implementation of the new preclearance strategy. Nixon 
reorganized the DOJ in 1969, during his first year in office.265 The change 
was consistent with Nixon’s stated desire to ensure that the young liberal 
lawyers in the CRD would be prevented from running wild through the 
South, enforcing compliance with extreme or punitive requirements they 
had formulated in Washington, D.C.266 But the shift from regional to 
functional assignments led to the creation of the Voting Section in the 
CRD, whose staff was committed to voting rights and developed an 
expertise in preclearance.267 Nixon’s attempt to kill section 5 aroused 
resistance, and Congress passed the 1970 Amendments to the Act.268 
Once it was clear that section 5 would now be enforced, conservatives in 
the South asked the administration for guidelines and procedures for 
section 5 preclearance.269 Finally, civil rights groups were spreading in the 
South and were becoming much more powerful regionally and in their 
influence on Congress. 
Far from dealing with covered jurisdictions with an iron fist, the 
preclearance procedures emerged in a context of significant challenges to 
the federal enforcement of civil rights during the 1970s and were shaped 
by compromise. Indeed, “[t]he strongest demands for regulations came 
from conservative southern lawyers who had to comply with the Act but 
did not know how to comply because there were no preclearance 
procedures in existence.”270 The new preclearance regime can hardly be 
said to have represented the intensification of DOJ intervention. It 
emerged during the early years of the Nixon administration, in a political 
climate much less punitive of Southern institutions of racism and 
segregation than the period immediately following the protest at 
Selma.271 In fact, civil rights activists were concerned during this period 
about a retrenchment by Southern jurisdictions, and viewed the DOJ’s 
 
 264. Days, supra note 184, at 64. 
 265. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 68. 
 266. Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon 440 (1978). 
 267. Posner notes that the delegation of the preclearance decision (but not the decision to 
interpose objections) to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, procedures for the 
Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (2005), and the further 
delegation of a large portion of the decisional authority to knowledgeable, committed, expert career 
government employees in the Voting Section, 28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (2004), were perhaps the most 
important provisions in the section 5 procedures. Posner, supra note 160, at 98–99. 
 268. Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. 
(2006)). 
 269. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 72. 
 270. Id. 
 271. See, e.g., Kousser, supra note 64, at 686–87 (2008). 
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implementation of section 5 as part and parcel of the federal government’s 
greater leniency.272 
A different explanation for the preclearance’s informal, dialogic 
enforcement process has been advanced by historians who have 
described the rise of an administrative model of civil rights reform in the 
1960s with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the VRA of 1965.273 The 
implementation of the preclearance regime can be seen as part of a 
broader historical shift away from a tort-based model of civil rights 
enforcement in the courts, resulting in a fundamental transformation of 
social regulation. Instead of assigning liability, the new focus was on 
compliance. Instead of identifying and prosecuting civil rights violations, 
the new administrative regime imposed strict liability. The adversarial 
relation between civil plaintiffs or government prosecutors on the one 
hand, and defendant jurisdictions on the other gave way to less formal 
administrative procedures that were more dialogic.274 
In City of Richmond v. United States,275 the Supreme Court 
essentially validated the DOJ’s enforcement strategy. The case involved 
a land annexation by Richmond, Virginia that decreased the black 
population from 52% to 42%.276 The DOJ had interposed an objection to 
an earlier annexation plan in 1971 but subsequently negotiated a 
compromise with the city.277 Richmond would be permitted to go ahead 
with the annexation, so long as it dropped its plan to adopt at-large 
elections.278 The city and the DOJ together sought entry of a consent 
decree that would approve an enlarged nine-ward city in which four 
wards were predominantly white, four were predominantly black, and 
one was three-fifths white and two-fifths black.279 The district court 
refused to issue the consent judgment, because it felt that the new plan 
diluted black voting strength.280 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the 
question presented was whether the annexation plan had either the 
purpose or the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote.281 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further 
consideration.282 It held that, assuming it could be established after 
further proceedings that the annexation had no discriminatory purpose, 
section 5 could be satisfied if Richmond created an electoral system that 
 
 272. Id. 
 273. See generally Graham, supra note 34, at 179. 
 274. Id. 
 275. 422 U.S. 358 (1975). 
 276. Id. at 362–63. 
 277. Id. at 363–64, 366. 
 278. See id. at 366. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 366–67. 
 281. Id. at 367. 
 282. Id. at 379. 
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afforded blacks “representation reasonably equivalent to their political 
strength in the enlarged community.”283 City of Richmond has been 
interpreted as a victory for the DOJ’s bargaining-compromise approach 
to preclearance.284 But it also vitiated the “effects” standard in 
annexation cases, and imposed on the Attorney General the difficult 
burden of proving discriminatory purpose in order to prevent the 
dilution of minority political voting strength by annexation.285 
Under section 5, a covered jurisdiction had to prove to the 
satisfaction of the Attorney General, that the new “voting, or standard, 
practice, or procedure with respect to voting . . . does not have the 
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to 
vote on account of race or color.”286 Both purpose and effect under 
section 5 were given special meanings by the Supreme Court, making the 
enforcement of section 5 more difficult and lowering the bar for local 
jurisdictions. 
In Beer v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted the effects 
prong.287 It held that the purpose of section 5 had always been that “no 
voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a 
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their 
effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”288 In Beer, the District Court 
for the District of Columbia declared a redistricting plan for New 
Orleans municipal elections to be in violation of section 5 because the 
plan failed to justify New Orleans’s retention of two at-large seats.289 The 
redistricting plan, however, did improve minority prospects overall as 
compared to the 1961 plan previously in effect. Under the 1961 plan, 
none of the five councilman districts had a clear black majority of 
registered voters, and no black had been elected to the New Orleans City 
Council while the plan was in effect.290 By contrast, under the new plan—
 
 283. Id. at 370. 
 284. Ball et al., supra note 27, at 100 (“Working together, the city officials and the federal 
regulators had worked out an agreement that might have pleased municipal managers but greatly 
displeased civil rights supporters. And the message was fairly clear to those city managers who were 
not overly enthusiastic about the Voting Rights Act: dilution of black voting strength was possible 
through annexation if the manager and his city attorneys, working with the DOJ, could develop a 
nonracial, that is, economic, administrative, etc., justification for the enlargement of a city that might 
be approaching a situation where a black voting majority could materialize.”). 
 285. Days, supra note 184, at 56. 
 286. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970). The statute was revised by section 5 of the VRARA. Fannie Lou 
Hamer, Rosa Parks and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act 
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 580 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006)) 
(striking “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect” and inserting “neither has the 
purpose nor will have the effect”). 
 287. 425 U.S. 130, 139–40 (1976). 
 288. Id. at 141. 
 289. Id. at 137–38. 
 290. Id. at 135. 
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to which both the CRD and the court objected—blacks constituted a 
majority of the population in two of the five districts and a clear majority 
of the registered voters in one of them.291 The new plan therefore 
represented a considerable improvement in minority access to 
representation, although it did not cure minority vote dilution. The 
Supreme Court held that this was all that section 5 required.292 By way of 
justification the Court cited the legislative history of the VRA in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach,293 and Justice Brennan’s dissent in City of 
Richmond v. United States,294 explaining that the VRA was enacted 
because “Congress desired to prevent States from ‘undo[ing] or 
defeat[ing] the rights recently won’ by Negroes,” but not to perfect those 
rights.295 
3. The Relative Impact of Litigation, and the Evolution of Vote 
Dilution Claims During the 1970s and 1980s 
Objections to the preclearance regime have been directed at 
transferring court-based authority to an administrative agency and, in 
particular, to an executive agency vulnerable to partisanship and 
ideology.296 The implication was that the Attorney General now had all 
the powers of a federal court, but none of the constraints, given the more 
limited procedural safeguards and the absence of a presumptively neutral 
judge.297 Depending on the administration in power, the Attorney 
General’s significant discretion had the potential for underenforcement, 
as claimed by voting rights advocates in the 1970s and 1980s and again 
during the Bush II administration,298 or for overreaching, as repeatedly 
charged by conservative critics, especially in the 1990s.299 
There is general agreement among historians that the preclearance 
process was an informal, pragmatic, dialogic process that applied a 
relatively lenient retrogression rule in case-by-case assessments in the 
1970s and 1980s.300 The DOJ’s preclearance policies in the 1990s, 
however, have been more controversial. During the 1980s, laws on 
 
 291. Id. at 135–38. 
 292. Id. at 140–41. 
 293. Id. at 140 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966)). 
 294. Id. at 141 n.12 (citing City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 359, 388 (1974)). 
 295. Id. at 140 (citing and quoting H.R. Rep. No. 91-397, at 8 (1970), reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3284). 
 296. Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee in 1965 stressed the partisan dangers of 
assigning preclearance to the DOJ. Kousser, supra note 64, at 688 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 89-439, at 46 
(1965)). 
 297. Cunningham, supra note 167, at 95. 
 298. Posner, supra note 257, at 2. 
 299. See generally Cunningham, supra note 167. 
 300. See generally Ball et al., supra note 27; Cunningham, supra note 167; Graham, supra note 
34. 
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majority-minority districting changed and the accuracy of computerized 
districting—right down to the census block level—made both partisan 
manipulation and racially sensitive districting inescapable in the 1990s 
redistricting round.301 Critics of the DOJ have argued that civil rights 
advocates captured the Voting Section in the 1990s, and that the CRD 
implemented an inflexible strategy of maximizing majority-minority 
districts during this period.302 This specific charge of “maximization” will 
be addressed in the following Part. 
A comprehensive study concludes that throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, jurisdictions rarely switched from at-large to district elections 
voluntarily.303 These changes were largely due to litigation.304 In contrast, 
“[t]he reach of section 5 in protecting against dilution was limited . . . .”305 
These findings contradict the critics who charge that preclearance has 
been far more intrusive than other enforcement regimes, echoing Justice 
Powell’s rather shrill warning that section 5 “destroys local control of the 
means of self-government” and “strips locally elected officials of their 
autonomy to chart policy.”306 This view cannot be maintained. Indeed, 
the DOJ could never do anything but enforce the law as it was written by 
Congress and interpreted by the Supreme Court. What had changed 
during the 1980s was the national political culture. Congress and the 
Supreme Court had accepted majority-minority districts as a necessary 
remedy for minority vote dilution, even as the measure produced 
significant controversy.307 
The submission process was undoubtedly much less onerous than 
litigation. Indeed, the initial proposal of section 5 before Congress did 
not provide for administrative preclearance but required that, in every 
case, jurisdictions seek a declaratory judgment from the district court in 
D.C.308 The administrative preclearance procedure was intended to 
lighten the burden on covered jurisdictions,309 as administrative 
 
 301. Cunningham, supra note 167, at 148 (“Technology presented a revolutionary capacity to 
aggregate minority populations in previously unthinkable manners.”); see also Pamela S. Karlan, The 
Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1705, 1726 (1993) (“Technology has 
largely marginalized the substantive impact of one-person, one-vote.”). 
 302. See generally Cunningham, supra note 167 (making the case); Ellen Katz, supra note 78 
(describing the Supreme Court’s increasing suspicion of the Voting Section’s preclearance decisions). 
 303. Peyton McCrary et al., Alabama, in Quiet Revolution, supra note 4, at 56; Laughlin 
McDonald et al., Georgia, in Quiet Revolution, supra note 4, at 99–100. 
 304. Davidson, supra note 162. 
 305. Id. 
 306. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 201–02 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 307. Karlan, supra note 301 at 1738–39. 
 308. Posner, supra note 257, at 6–7. See generally Preclearance Hearing, supra note 168, app. at 106 
(prepared testimony of Peyton McCrary et al.) (“Preclearance review by the Department provides a 
quicker and less expensive alternative to litigation and the Department seeks to function as a 
‘surrogate’ for the District of Columbia trial courts.”). 
 309. See Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 503–04 (1976) (noting that the availability of expeditious 
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preclearance is far more informal, expeditious, and economical than a 
court action for declaratory judgment.310 The mere fact that covered 
jurisdictions have sought preclearance from the court in only the rarest 
of cases is telling.311 Since 1965, the DOJ has reviewed over 435,000 
voting changes, while only sixty-eight declaratory judgment actions have 
been filed.312 Covered jurisdictions approach preclearance as an 
administrative matter. They do not treat it like litigation, and they 
frequently rely on administrative personnel to process the submission.313 
There is thus no doubt that administrative preclearance is “substantially 
faster, simpler, and cheaper” than a declaratory judgment action.314 
Regardless, the Attorney General’s determinations must conform to 
the determinations reached in the federal courts. As already noted, 
preclearance did not impose any additional legal requirements on 
redistrictings, annexations, voter registration procedures, or ballot access 
rules other than those guaranteed by the Constitution.315 To the contrary, 
the retrogression standard lowered the bar. 
It was the persistent litigation by civil rights groups under section 2 
of the VRA that would establish and refine a new standard for racial 
vote dilution. These lawsuits forced the creation of majority-minority 
districts and led to significant increases in minority representation.316 
Section 2 of the VRA was not one of the key provisions of the original 
Act.317 In 1982, Congress amended section 2 to adopt an explicit results 
standard,318 and in so doing adopted the standards for minority vote 
dilution that the Court had recognized in White v. Regester, after many 
years of litigation by the voting rights bar. 
In White v. Regester, the Supreme Court, for the first time, found 
that minority vote dilution through the use of at-large elections had been 
proven.319 White struck down multi-member districts in Dallas and Bexar 
 
preclearance rulings is central to the section 5 scheme, and that degrading this feature would 
substantially increase the severity of the section 5 remedy); see also Posner, supra note 257, at 17. 
 310. Posner, supra note 257, at 6. 
 311. See Days, supra note 184, at 53 n.2 (noting that, while the DOJ reviewed over 188,000 changes 
between 1965 and 1991, only twenty jurisdictions sought judicial preclearance between 1965 and 1969). 
 312. Posner, supra note 257, at 6. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id.; see also Spencer Overton, Stealing Democracy 106 (2006) (estimating that South Carolina 
spends less than $500 on each preclearance request); Tokaji, supra note 64, at 795–97. 
 315. See supra notes 148–65 and accompanying text. 
 316. Davidson, supra note 162, at 32–36. 
 317. Id.; see Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1973 (1964 & Supp. I)). 
 318. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006) (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, 
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner 
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973(b)(f)(2) of this 
title, as provided in subsection (b) . . . .”).  
 319. 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973). 
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Counties, Texas, based on its examination of a “laundry list” of factors320 
that pointed to the use of multi-member districts as discriminatory or as 
enhancing the opportunity for discrimination.321 The White majority 
concluded that, based on its examination of the “totality of 
circumstances,” blacks and Mexican-Americans “had less opportunity 
than did other residents in the district to participate in the political 
processes and to elect legislators of their choice.”322 In Zimmer v. 
McKeithen, the Fifth Circuit refined the standard by systematizing the 
factors and giving them additional analytic content.323 The White/Zimmer 
test demanded an inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the adoption of the local plan and the maintenance of the local voting 
practices, the history of past racial discrimination in the community, 
whether alternative practices would give minorities a better chance to 
elect candidates of their choice, whether racial groups tended to vote in 
blocs, and whether minorities had previously been elected to office, in 
addition to other factors.324 
The White/Zimmer factors provided plaintiffs in voting rights cases 
with a roadmap for bringing vote dilution cases. Despite the heavy 
burden of proof, plaintiffs filed at least forty constitutional challenges to 
at-large election schemes throughout the covered states between 1973 
and 1980.325 
In 1980, however, to the great consternation of the voting rights bar 
and the civil rights community, the Supreme Court struck a blow to this 
litigation strategy.326 Following its 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis, 
requiring plaintiffs claiming race discrimination under the Equal 
Protection Clause to show discriminatory intent,327 the Supreme Court 
held in City of Mobile v. Bolden that plaintiffs bringing racial vote 
dilution claims also had to show discriminatory intent.328 The passage of 
 
 320. Davidson, supra note 162, at 28. 
 321. 412 U.S. at 769. 
 322. Id. at 766. 
 323. 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 324. Id. (“[W]here a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process of slating candidates, 
the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests, a tenuous state policy underlying 
the preference for multi-member or at-large districting, or that the existence of past discrimination in 
general precludes the effective participation in the election system, a strong case is made. Such proof is 
enhanced by a showing of the existence of large districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot 
voting provisions and the lack of provision for at-large candidates from running from particular 
geographical subdistricts. . . . [A]ll these factors need not be proved in order to obtain relief.”). 
 325. Davidson, supra note 162, at 28. 
 326. Armand Derfner called the decision “devastating. Dilution cases came to a virtual standstill; 
existing cases were overturned and dismissed while plans for new cases were abandoned.” Armand 
Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, in Minority Vote Dilution 
149 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989). 
 327. 426 U.S. 229, 239–45 (1976). 
 328. 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (“[O]nly if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
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the 1982 amendments reversed the Supreme Court’s intent requirement, 
reinstated a multifactor test, and adopted a results standard. Henceforth, 
racial vote discrimination would be:  
[E]stablished if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that 
the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or 
political subdivision are not equally open to participation [by members 
of a protected racial or language minority] in that its members have 
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in 
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.329 
Construing amended section 2 in Thornburg v. Gingles, the 
Supreme Court substantially streamlined the evidentiary requirements 
for minority plaintiffs.330 The plaintiffs in Gingles challenged the dilutive 
effect of multi-member districts in North Carolina’s 1981 legislative plan 
and sought relief in the form of single-member majority-minority 
districts.331 The Gingles Court identified three criteria for claims of at-
large dilutionary effects: (1) that the minority group “is sufficiently large 
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member 
district”; (2) that the minority group is “politically cohesive”; and (3) that 
“the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to 
defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”332 A minority plaintiff’s case 
would depend on showing sufficient levels of racial bloc voting and 
establishing that a reasonably compact majority-minority district could 
be drawn to afford members of the minority group the ability to elect a 
candidate of their choice.333 Only then would the Court proceed to the 
“intensely local appraisal” contemplated by the White/Zimmer totality of 
circumstances inquiry.334 
At-large elections all but disappeared in covered jurisdictions. A 
remarkable shift to single-member districts with majority-minority 
districts occurred, driven, for the most part, by litigation. Alabama 
presents an illustrative case. An empirical study shows that forty-two of 
forty-eight Alabama cities with a population equal to or greater than 
6000 switched from at-large elections to district-based elections or a 
mixed plan.335 The study concludes that “[l]itigation was the principal 
cause of these changes, accounting for 26 of the new district systems and 
1 of the shifts to a mixed plan[.]”336 Whereas the preclearance process 
“was sometimes the cause of changes to district elections in 
Alabama[,] . . . . [i]n most jurisdictions[,] . . . the principal means of 
 
 329. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006). 
 330. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 331. Id. at 35. 
 332. Id. at 48–51. 
 333. Id.; see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013 (1994). 
 334. 478 U.S. at 78. 
 335. McCrary et al., supra note 303, at 55. 
 336. Id. 
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securing equitable election plans was through litigation.”337 The authors 
note that the preclearance requirements did, however, “serve at least an 
educational function” in cases that appeared purely voluntary.338 The 
relative impact of litigation on the abandonment of discriminatory at-
large voting systems is similar in the other southern states.339 
These developments show that the CRD was far less coercive in 
forcing majority/minority districts on covered jurisdictions than litigation, 
even as critics generally maintained that preclearance was far more 
intrusive. Rather, the CRD followed determinations by the federal 
courts.340 As the federal courts began to recognize vote dilution challenges 
to at-large election systems in jurisdictions with evidence of racially-
polarized voting and of a history of racial discrimination, the CRD 
increasingly objected to those plans as well. Similarly, when, as a result of 
Thornburg v. Gingles, section 2 was interpreted to require additional 
majority-minority districts as a remedy for minority vote dilution, the 
CRD became more insistent on the creation of additional majority-
minority districts when reviewing submissions in the preclearance 
process.341  
If anything, the switch in covered jurisdictions from at-large to 
district-based election systems during the 1980s resulted in fewer 
objections. As noted by Posner, “A significant percentage of the 
Department’s Section 5 objections historically have been directed at 
election changes that generally are discriminatory only in the context of 
at-large elections (majority vote requirements, anti-single-shot voting 
provisions, and annexations).”342 A switch to districting rendered many of 
these issues moot. Indeed, the number of objections significantly 
 
 337. Id. at 48. 
 338. Id. at 55 n.146. 
 339. McDonald, supra note 303, at 78 (“Seventy-seven law suits were filed against the surveyed 
jurisdictions alone, challenging at-large elections under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, the 
preclearance provisions of section 5, and amended section 2. While the Justice Department played a 
key role in the enforcement of section 5, virtually all of the litigation challenging election structures 
was brought by civil rights organizations on behalf of the minority community.”). As McDonald notes, 
“Section 5 has successfully blocked the introduction of many new attempts at vote dilution. Section 2, 
since its amendment in 1982, has proved a potent force in challenging existing discriminatory 
practices.” Id. at 90. 
 340. Turner, supra note 168, at 296–99. 
 341. See Preclearance Hearing, supra note 168, app. at 133–34 (prepared testimony of Peyton 
McCrary et al.) (“During the 1970’s, at-large elections and enhancing devices together were denied 
preclearance 292 times, 59 percent of all objectionable changes, but only 86 redistricting plans (17 
percent) were the subject of objections . . . . By the 1980s, the picture . . . is more mixed: the 
Department interposed objections to 150 at-large election plans and enhancing devices (35 percent of 
objectionable changes) and denied preclearance to 165 redistricting plans (16 percent). In the 1990s, 
at-large elections and enhancing devices were the subject of objections only 104 times, 26 percent of 
objectionable changes, but the Department denied preclearance to a striking 209 redistricting plans 
(52 percent)—over half of all changes to which objections were interposed . . . .”). 
 342. Posner, supra note 168, at 15 n.28. 
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declined in the 1980s, even as the number of submissions increased 
dramatically. 
Finally, the open antidiscrimination standard governing 
preclearance determinations evolved as voting rights law evolved. 
Preclearance did not take place in an institutional vacuum. It was guided 
by the developments in the federal courts. Two social scientists have 
described this institutional capacity for innovation as follows: 
Because the Voting Rights Act does not formulate specific tests for 
vote dilution, the meaning of that concept has been the topic of 
continuous case-by-case adjudication, while at the same time there has 
been an ongoing evolution of administrative standards within the 
Voting Section of the Justice Department. The interpretation of the 
Act has involved a remarkable sequence of interactions, leading 
perhaps to a kind of ‘reflective equilibrium’ in which social scientists’ 
courtroom testimony in voting rights cases in the 70s and late 60s 
influences judicial interpretation of the statute, which in turn set the 
stage for law review articles and further social science testimony in the 
1980s on the proper interpretation of terms such as ‘racially polarized 
voting” culminating in [Thornburg v. Gingles], which in turn becomes 
the basis for subsequent lower court decisions.343 
In other words, the evolving preclearance standards fed into, and 
reflected, the evolution of standards nationwide, particularly in the more 
complicated area of racial vote dilution. The increasingly accurate tests 
for racial vote dilution naturally influenced the review of submissions 
and submission requirements. 
4. The Focus on Redistricting During the 1990s and the Supreme 
Court’s Shaw Jurisprudence 
Congress effectively issued a mandate to create majority-minority 
districts to remedy vote dilution in the 1982 amendments to section 2.344 
But the statute was approved in the Senate with the proviso that 
“[n]othing in this Section shall be read to guarantee the election of 
minority group representatives in proportion to the minority group’s 
share of population.”345 This created a conceptual difficulty, as 
proportionality was the most obvious measure of fair representation and 
the natural stopping-point for drawing additional majority-minority 
districts.346 Section 2, however, provides that “nothing in this section 
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in 
 
 343. Bernard Grofman, Expert Witness Testimony and the Evolution of Voting Rights Case Law, in 
Controversies in Minority Voting, supra note 34, at 197, 223–24.  
 344. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)). 
 345. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
 346. Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Righs Act: A 
Legislative History, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1347, 1392 (1983). 
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numbers equal to their proportions in the population.”347 This language 
codified the considerable ambivalence and distaste for majority-minority 
districts on the part of conservatives.348 Majority-minority districts have 
been a major focus of controversy about the VRA ever since. 
Majority-minority districts have produced cross-cutting allegiances. 
Political strategists for the Republican National Party eager to pack 
black (predominantly Democratic) voters into highly concentrated 
districts sided with the ACLU and other civil rights organizations in 
advocating for maximizing majority-minority districts.349 There are many 
empirical studies that show majority-minority districts cost Democrats 
seats Congress in 1992 and 1994.350 Majority-minority districts have 
further offended conservative opponents of affirmative action and have 
troubled academics concerned about competitive elections.351 Moreover 
majority-minority districts involve trade-offs concerning minority voice 
and integration. Like democracy itself, however, majority-minority 
districts may be the best of many less-than-ideal choices for improving 
access to the political process. 
During the 1990s, the Voting Section became heavily embroiled in 
this controversy, because it was perceived to have embarked on an 
aggressive policy of “maximization” in the preclearance process. In an 
article published in 1992, Days expressed his view that “the 1982 
amendments . . . incorporat[ed] . . . the new Section 2 standards into the 
section 5 preclearance process” and that the DOJ “has taken the position 
that such an incorporation was mandated by Congress.”352 Citing an 
objection letter issued in 1991 by President Bush’s Assistant Attorney 
General for Civil Rights, John Dunne, Days observed that: 
Under the department’s approach, of course, the retrogression 
standard of Beer no longer poses an obstacle to full evaluation of 
proposed changes. The question instead becomes whether the changes 
provide minority voters with the greatest feasible access to the political 
 
 347. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. This provision is also referred to as the “Dole proviso.” 
 348. Boyd & Markman, supra note 346, at 1339, 1389–94. 
 349. Cunningham, supra note 167, at 104–10; see also David T. Canon, Race, Redistricting, and 
Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts 74–75 (1999). 
 350. Grant Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma of Minority Representation, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1589, 
1609–10 (2004). Models by political economists show there were no such “perverse” effects. See, e.g., 
Keisuke Nakao, Racial Redistricting for Minority Representation, 23 Econ. & Pol. 132 (2006). The 
debate continues. Canon is correct in suggesting that “[i]n any event it seems clear that white 
incumbents have not been as harmed as Democratic partisans feared, nor as much as Republican 
partisans hoped.” Canon, supra note 349, at 74. 
 351. See authorities cited supra note 170; see also Bruce E. Cain et al., From Equality to Fairness: 
The Path of Political Reform Since Baker v. Carr, in Party Lines: Competition, Partisanship, and 
Congressional Redistricting 6, 26 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005). 
 352. Days, supra note 184, at 57. 
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process in light of the “totality of the circumstances.” This issue will 
have to be resolved ultimately by the Supreme Court.353 
Conservatives charged that civil rights groups captured the CRD, and 
that when John Dunne took office in 1990, the CRD adopted a much 
more aggressive and rigid strategy of requiring jurisdictions to draw as 
many majority-minority districts as possible.354 In 1991, Dunne objected 
to Mississippi’s state house and senate plans and to five of the first six 
state legislative maps in Texas.355 The rulings engendered intense interest. 
Voting rights advocates hailed Dunne’s more aggressive policy, 
proclaiming that it addressed “the central question in redistricting: 
maximization.”356 An article in the Congressional Quarterly concluded 
that the objections meant that covered jurisdictions now would be 
required to draw as many majority-minority districts as possible.357 John 
Dunne himself acknowledged that he might have “wandered into 
maximization.”358 
The Supreme Court intervened in Shaw v. Reno359 and Miller v. 
Johnson,360 strongly rebuking the DOJ for having gone too far in pushing 
majority-minority districts. In Shaw, white voters challenged two 
majority-minority congressional districts that North Carolina had drawn 
as part of their redistricting plan after the 1990 Census gave the state an 
additional congressional seat.361 The first plan that North Carolina had 
submitted for preclearance contained only one majority black district out 
of twelve total districts statewide.362 Blacks constituted 20% of the 
population in the state.363 The DOJ objected to the plan on the grounds 
that it diluted the minority vote, claiming that the North Carolina 
General Assembly could have created a second majority-minority district 
but failed to do so for “pretextual reasons.”364 In 1991, the legislature 
then enacted a new plan with two majority-black districts, and the DOJ 
precleared the plan.365 White voters challenged the plan, claiming that it 
was as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander that violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment.366 Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor 
 
 353. Id. 
 354. Cunningham, supra note 167, at 97. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Beth Donovan, Nation Watches as Texas Struggles to Create Minority Districts, 49 Cong. Q. 
Wkly. Rep. 2293, 2293–95 (Aug. 17, 1991). 
 358. Cunningham, supra note 167, at 144. 
 359. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 360. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
 361. 509 U.S. at 633–34. 
 362. Id. at 634–35. 
 363. Id. at 633. 
 364. Id. at 635. 
 365. Id. at 635–36. 
 366. Id. at 633–34. 
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found the shape of the district “so bizarre on its face” and such a 
departure from traditional districting criteria (geographic compactness, 
contiguousness, conformity to geographic boundaries or political 
subdivisions) that it seemed “unexplainable on grounds other than 
race.”367 According to Justice O’Connor, the plan thus bore “an 
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid” that reinforced 
“impermissible racial stereotypes.”368 White voters had thus stated “an 
analytically distinct claim” under the Equal Protection Clause that gave 
them standing to sue on the grounds that they were unconstitutionally 
classified based on race. 
In Miller v. Johnson, Georgia redrew its congressional redistricting 
plan in response to a DOJ objection under section 5.369 Ruling on a 
constitutional challenge to the new plan, the Supreme Court held that 
the DOJ had inappropriately interposed objections to maximize the 
number of majority-minority districts.370 In doing so, the DOJ had 
exceeded its authority under the statute.371 “Instead of grounding its 
objections on evidence of a discriminatory purpose,” the Court found 
that “it would appear the [department] was driven by its policy of 
maximizing majority-black districts,” thereby expanding its Section 5 
authority “beyond what Congress intended” and the Court previously 
upheld.372 The Court charged the DOJ with forcing states to “engage in 
presumptively unconstitutional race-based districting.”373 Congressional 
districts were “presumptively unconstitutional” if race was the 
“predominant factor” in their creation. And a jurisdiction’s interest in 
complying with section 5, the Court held, did not constitute a compelling 
justification for this type of government action.374 
Arguably, then, the DOJ intruded significantly on covered 
jurisdictions during the early 1990s with regard to the preclearance of 
districting plans—if, that is, one grants the conservative interpretation of 
these events. Can this be reconciled with the argument presented here, 
that preclearance is consistent with localism and functioned, for the most 
part, as a flexible monitoring/learning regime? 
Much ink has been spilled on the question of whether the DOJ 
exceeded its authority in the early 1990s. CRD career staff has 
persistently denied that a maximization policy was ever followed, but 
 
 367. Id. at 644 (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 
(1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 368. Id. at 647. 
 369. 515 U.S. 900, 907 (1995). 
 370. See generally Cunningham, supra note 167. 
 371. Posner, supra note 168, at 80. 
 372. 515 U.S. at 924–25. 
 373. Id. at 927. 
 374. Id. at 926–27. 
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have maintained that, after Beer, the Voting Section relied on 
discriminatory intent as articulated in Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.375 and Wilkes County v. United 
States376 in analyzing districting cases.377 Critics countered that the Voting 
Section considered failure to maximize majority-minority districts 
evidence of discriminatory purpose per se.378 But this is a 
misunderstanding of the Arlington Heights standard. Under Arlington 
Heights, so long as other legitimate reasons for note drawing a majority-
minority district were not deemed pretextual, the Attorney General 
would not object to vote changes.379 Career staff, serving both Republican 
and Democratic administrations, claim that they did not change the 
standard or significantly alter preclearance procedures in the 1990s.380 
They also reject the charge of a politicization of preclearance during 
the Bush I and Clinton years.381 The “bottom up” review process of 
section 5 preclearance, according to staff, has been a “key institutional 
bulwark in the DOJ against political decision-making.”382 Only after the 
staff of the Voting Section has decided to recommend an objection 
unanimously does the decision go up to the politically appointed 
Assistant Attorney General.383 Decisions to preclear are forwarded to the 
Assistant Attorney General for decision only “where the change is of 
great significance (such as a statewide districting) or otherwise 
particularly controversial.”384 Historically, the Attorney General has 
never interposed an objection to a preclearance plan when the Voting 
Section unanimously recommended it.385 Even if the DOJ became more 
aggressive in pushing for majority-minority districts, by far the most 
important factor in the creation of majority-minority districts was 
litigation. 
 
 375. 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977). 
 376. 450 F. Supp. 1171, 1174–78 (D.D.C. 1976), aff’d mem., 439 U.S. 999 (1976). 
 377. See Posner, supra note 168, at 80; McCrary et al., supra note 168, at 284–86. 
 378. Cunningham, supra note 167, at 148. 
 379. See Preclearance Hearing, supra note 168, at 8 (testimony of Mark A. Posner, Professor, Am. 
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In addition, the Shaw line of cases placed significant limits on the 
ability of the DOJ to require covered jurisdictions to draw additional 
majority-minority districts. Critics of the Court were appalled by the 
creation of a new cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment that 
threw the “relatively orderly process of elaborating and refining the host 
of questions raised by Congress . . . to an abrupt end.”386 Shaw and its 
progeny threatened to undermine gains in black representation by 
casting the creation of majority-minority districts into doubt. Even as 
Justice O’Connor provided additional guidance to “[s]tates and lower 
Courts . . . toil[ing] with the twin demands of the Fourteenth 
Amendment [i.e. Shaw challenges] and the VRA,” in Bush v. Vera, the 
Court never clarified what it meant by an impermissible “predominant 
racial motive” in the creation of majority-minority districts.387 Clearly any 
remedial effort would, in one sense, be driven by a racial motive, 
whereas in another sense, as Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent in 
Abrams v. Johnson, “racial motives . . . never explain a predominant 
portion of a district’s entire boundary . . . .”388 
By 1993–1994, at any rate, the Supreme Court had started to put the 
brakes on any DOJ attempts to push a maximization agenda via 
preclearance. If, indeed, the preclearance process had become too 
intrusive, inflexible, and commandeering in the redistricting context, 
Shaw and its progeny insisted on a more passive approach by the DOJ by 
undercutting objections to redistricting plans based on discriminatory 
purpose.389 Grofman and Brunell have insisted that “in comparing the 
1990s round and the 2000 round of redistricting, we believe it hard for 
anyone to dispute that, in 2000, DOJ was exercising much greater caution 
in deciding on which district merited an objection under section 5 than in 
the 1990s . . . .”390 That the Supreme Court would play a role in defining 
the limits of preclearance was, of course, contemplated by the statutory 
scheme, even if one believes that the choice to do so in the case of North 
Carolina’s redistricting plan in Shaw on Fourteenth Amendment grounds 
was ill considered. 
 
 386. Canon, supra note 349, at 77. 
 387. 517 U.S. 952, 990 (1996) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 388. 521 U.S. 74, 116 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 389. Objections based on retrogression constituted 83%, 66%, 40%, and 98% of all objections 
interposed during 1965–1979, the 1980s, the 1990s, and during 2000–2005, respectively. See Posner, 
supra note 160, at 108 tbl.2. Thus, while the Attorney General interposed an increasing percentage of 
total objections based on discriminatory purpose during the 1980s and the early 1990s, that trend was 
abruptly curtailed by 2000. See id. Moreover, the total number of submissions by the Attorney General 
dropped significantly, beginning in 1996. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel Charles, The Politics 
of Preclearance, 12 Mich. J. Race & L. 512, 519–21 (2007). 
 390. Bernard Grofman & Thomas Brunell, Extending Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The 
Complex Interaction Between Law and Politics, in The Future of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 
81, at 311, 326. 
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Other observers, however, have interpreted the Shaw line of cases 
as relatively tentative. Professor Sunstein has written: 
[F]ollowing Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s cautious lead, the heart of 
the current Court avoids clear rules and final resolutions. It allows 
room for Congress’s and the states’ continued democratic deliberation, 
and to accommodate new judgments about facts and values. It is a 
court that leaves fundamental issues undecided . . . .  
 . . . . 
. . . [T]he court has avoided simple rules in its series of cases involving 
bizarrely shaped voting districts redrawn to produce a different racial 
makeup; it has insisted instead that constitutional challenges would 
have to be decided on the basis of the details . . . .  
. . . .  
. . . [The decisions are] ambivalent or catalytic rather than final or 
decisive. If these points are right, O’Connor’s distinctive concurring 
opinions represent not a failure of judicial nerve, but a healthy 
reminder that judges are mere participants in America’s process of 
democratic deliberation . . . .391 
In other words, the maximization controversy related primarily to 
redistricting. But redistricting constituted only a small percentage of all 
submissions. From 1982 to 2004, only 2.4% of changes involved 
redistrictings (8622 of about 320,000 changes).392 Redistrictings drew 
proportionately 16.4% of all objections.393 But the DOJ interposed many 
more objections to other types of changes, such as annexations and 
boundary changes (45%), and changes to methods of election (24.4%).394 
These three types of changes comprised an overwhelming 85.8% of all 
objections interposed. Precinct, polling places, and absentee ballot 
changes made up only 3.7% of all objections, despite accounting for the 
highest percentage of submitted changes, at 43.7%.395 Objections to 
redistrictings declined significantly during the period from 1995 to 2004, 
from 318 between 1982 and 2004 to 46 between 1995 and 2004: 87.4% 
objections to redistrictings were lodged before 1995.396 
5. The Nonretrogression Standard During the Post-Shaw Period 
In its post-Shaw jurisprudence, the Supreme Court interpreted 
Beer’s nonretrogression standard ever more narrowly in other areas as 
well, cabining DOJ discretion, reducing its authority to interpose 
 
 391. Cass R. Sunstein, Supreme Caution: Once Again, the High Court Takes Only Small Steps, 
Wash. Post, July 6, 1997, at C1. 
 392. VRA Enforcement Record, supra note 158, at 34 tbl.6. 
 393. Id. at 36 & fig.4. 
 394. Id. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. at 35 & tbl.5. But redistrictings declined less than other types of changes and, during the 
period between 1995 and 2004, constituted the greatest absolute number of objections. Id. 
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objections, and limiting its ability to communicate with local 
jurisdictions.397 In Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier Parish I), 
the Court elaborated its view that the retrogression standard did not 
authorize the Attorney General to interpose an objection on the grounds 
that a voting change violates the Constitution or section 2 of the VRA.398 
In Bossier Parish II, the Court went even further in advancing the 
somewhat bizarre judgment that even discriminatory intent could not 
justify an objection to a vote change by the DOJ; only a strangely 
metaphysical “retrogressive intent” would justify a DOJ objection.399 The 
Court fixated on the “federalism costs” of preclearance, as it increasingly 
limited its reach.400 Katz has argued that these decisions reflected the 
Supreme Court majority’s view that the DOJ was overreaching.401 In 
several decisions, the lower courts had specifically criticized the 
administration of section 5 review, condemning the DOJ’s practice of 
informal negotiations and exchanges between the Voting Section staff 
and covered jurisdictions, as well as the close relationship between the 
staff and civil rights groups who were active in enforcing the VRA.402 The 
district court in Miller had vehemently criticized the “close cooperation” 
between the DOJ and the ACLU, calling the frequent communication 
between the two “disturbing” and “an embarrassment.”403 
This cramped interpretation of retrogression misinterpreted the 
compromise struck in the 1970s and 1980s to accept gradual, incremental 
change. After Beer, the DOJ could still rely on discriminatory purpose to 
push for incremental change. Now the DOJ was barred from urging any 
amelioration on covered jurisdictions, limiting it entirely to preventing 
“backsliding.” Discriminatory purpose could also no longer serve as a 
basis for objections as it had in the past.404 The Supreme Court thereby 
undercut the dialogic strategy that characterized the administrative 
 
 397. Posner, supra note 168, at 94–95. 
 398. 520 U.S. 471, 475–76 (1997). This invalidated the DOJ’s regulation that specified that a “clear” 
results violation should trigger an objection. “A ‘results violation’ refers to a voting plan or proposal 
intentionally drawn to minimize minority voting strength[], and which has a discriminatory result in 
violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.” VRA Enforcement Record, supra note 158, at 21 
n.85. 
 399. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320, 337–41 (2000). 
 400. Posner, supra note 168, at 80. 
 401. See generally Katz, supra note 78. 
 402. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 167, at 54. 
 403. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1362, 1368 (S.D. Ga. 1994). 
 404. As Posner told Congress, 
[T]he section 5 purpose test now only applies if, per chance, a jurisdiction were to intend to 
cause a retrogression in minorities’ electoral opportunity, but somehow messes up and 
adopts a change that, in fact, is not retrogressive. This is highly unlikely to occur, and in fact, 
in the nearly 5 years since Bossier Parish was decided, the Justice Department has reviewed 
approximately 76,000 voting changes and no such incompetent retrogressor has appeared.  
Preclearance Hearing, supra note 168, at 20 (testimony of Mark A. Posner, Professor, Am. Univ.). 
Halberstam-62-HLJ-923 (Do Not Delete) 4/28/2011 12:21 PM 
982 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:923 
preclearance process—an ironic outcome, given the Court’s criticism of 
what it perceived as the DOJ’s unilateral maximization policy. Against 
the background of the Supreme Court’s increasing limitation on both the 
DOJ’s authority and the reach of the retrogression standard, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft was viewed as one 
further step in the “retrogression of retrogression.”405 
In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court addressed the flexibility of the 
preclearance standard and reaffirmed the importance of local voice.406 On 
both counts the Court arguably solved a problem that did not exist. The 
case likely arose in the first place because of the straightjacket that the 
Court had imposed on the Voting Section. When the parties arrived in 
court, the first question that one of the panel judges asked was why they 
had not been able to work something out, given the small differences in 
their positions.407 The answer was that the Court’s severe condemnation 
of DOJ pressure on covered jurisdictions made it very difficult for the 
DOJ to carry on such conversations.408 
Ashcroft involved Georgia’s post-2000 legislative redistricting 
plan.409 The plan was the result of a partisan gerrymander by white and 
black Democratic legislators.410 In an effort to hold onto the statehouse in 
the face of an inevitable Republican trend, Georgia’s legislative 
redistricting committee proposed a plan that unpacked existing black 
majority-minority districts in order to redistribute black (read 
Democratic) voters to democratic candidates in adjacent districts.411 The 
redistricting plan shaved existing majority-minority districts precariously 
thin, reducing by five the number of districts with a black voting age 
population in excess of 60%, and added only one majority-minority 
district of more than 50% black voting age population (“BVAP”).412 
Because of low levels of registration and turnout in African-American 
communities, and high levels of racially-polarized voting, a BVAP over 
60% or 65% had frequently been necessary to afford blacks the ability to 
elect candidates of their choice in Georgia state legislative districts.413 
Nonetheless, the plan was approved near unanimously by the black 
 
 405. Karlan, supra note 3. 
 406. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). 
 407. Telephone Interview with David Becker, Project Dir., Election Initiatives for the Pew Ctr. on 
the States (Dec. 5, 2009). 
 408. Id. 
 409. Specifically, Ashcroft involved Georgia’s senate plan, which was also at issue in Miller. 
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 466–69. 
 410. Id. at 469 (“The goal of the Democratic leadership—black and white—was to maintain the 
number of majority-minority districts and also increase the number of Democratic Senate seats.”); see 
also Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1716. 
 411. Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1716. 
 412. Id. 
 413. Id. 
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legislative delegation.414 Robert Brown, who chaired the subcommittee 
that had drawn up the senate plan, was also African-American.415 Brown 
testified at trial in support of the plan, as did other leading African-
American legislators.416 
The DOJ precleared the statehouse plan, but objected that the 
reductions in black voting age populations in Senate Districts 2 (from 
60.58 % to 50.31%), 12 (from 55.43% to 50.66%), and 15 (from 62.45% 
to 50.80%) threatened the ability of minority voters to reelect black 
incumbents.417 At trial, the DOJ relied on expert testimony that the 
percentages were not sufficient for black voters to elect candidates of 
their choice, given the levels of racial bloc voting.418 The district court 
sided with the DOJ and refused to preclear the plan.419 
In an opinion written by Justice O’Connor, the Supreme Court 
adopted the dissenting district court judge’s view that “would have given 
‘greater credence to the political expertise and motivation of Georgia’s 
African-American political leaders’” than to the DOJ experts.420 The 
Court cited testimony by Georgia’s black legislative leaders and 
Congressman John Lewis that emphasized the importance of unpacking 
black majority-minority districts to extend the influence of the black 
vote, and, most importantly, to preserve the Democratic majority in the 
statehouse, which guaranteed valuable committee chairmanships and 
leadership positions to blacks.421 Specifically, 
Congressman Lewis testified that “giving real power to black voters 
comes from the kind of redistricting efforts the State of Georgia has 
made,” and that the Senate plan “will give real meaning to voting for 
African Americans” because “you have a greater chance of putting in 
office people that are going to be responsive.”422  
According to the Court, the new plan was not retrogressive. It preserved 
black legislative leadership positions. It promoted coalition-building 
across racial lines by lowering BVAP. And it created additional so-called 
“influence districts” in which minorities could play a substantial, if not 
decisive role, in electing a candidate for office.423 
Even as the Court questioned the DOJ’s application of the old 
preclearance standard to the facts of the case, it redefined the 
nonretrogression standard in the vote-dilution context. Whereas 
 
 414. Id. at 1716–17. 
 415. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 40, 42 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated, 539 U.S. 461 (2003). 
 416. See id. at 42, 89. 
 417. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 472–73. 
 418. Id. at 473. 
 419. Id. at 474. 
 420. Id. at 475 (quoting Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 102 (Oberdorfer, J., dissenting)). 
 421. Id. at 472. 
 422. Id. at 489. 
 423. Id. at 487–88. 
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previously the retrogression inquiry had focused on a minority’s 
“ability . . . to elect candidates of [their] choice,” the Court now 
emphasized a much broader metric: “the extent of the minority group’s 
opportunity to participate in the political process.”424 The Court rejected 
any “single statistic,” and called for a “totality of circumstances” 
assessment that included the creation of minority “influence districts” 
and legislative leadership positions as relevant factors.425 Justice 
O’Connor wrote for the majority: 
[A]ny assessment of the retrogression of a minority group’s effective 
exercise of the electoral franchise depends on an examination of all the 
relevant circumstances, such as the ability of minority voters to elect 
their candidate of choice, the extent of the minority group’s 
opportunity to participate in the political process, and the feasibility of 
creating a nonretrogressive plan. . . . 
  In assessing the totality of the circumstances, a court should not 
focus solely on the comparative ability of a minority group to elect a 
candidate of its choice. While this factor is an important one in the § 5 
retrogression inquiry, it cannot be dispositive or exclusive. . . . 
. . . . 
  In addition to the comparative ability of a minority group to elect a 
candidate of its choice, the other highly relevant factor in a 
retrogression inquiry is the extent to which a new plan changes the 
minority group’s opportunity to participate in the political process. 
“[T]he power to influence the political process is not limited to winning 
elections.”  
  Thus, a court must examine whether a new plan adds or subtracts 
“influence districts”—where minority voters may not be able to elect a 
candidate of choice but can play a substantial, if not decisive, role in 
the electoral process.426 
The Ashcroft decision was highly controversial. The decision clearly 
reaffirmed the case-by-case assessment and flexibility of the preclearance 
standard. It also explicitly deferred to local knowledge over expert 
analysis. Commentators concerned about competitive elections, and 
increasingly skeptical about the continued need for guaranteed safe seats 
for black legislators in the South, welcomed the Court’s abandonment of 
what they saw as the “relatively mechanical assessment of voting 
practices” under section 5 that had turned the assessment of black 
electoral opportunity into “little more than . . . sixth-grade arithmetic.”427 
Ashcroft supporters suggested that the pre-Ashcroft standard was a rigid 
understanding of the VRA that completely inverted the Act’s policies.428 
 
 424. Id. at 482. 
 425. Id. at 480–81. 
 426. Id. at 479–80, 482 (citations omitted) (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 99 (1986) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 427. Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1713. 
 428. The Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
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On the other hand, voting rights advocates feared that Ashcroft 
spelled the end of descriptive representation, which had been the 
baseline for gains in black representation.429 They also questioned the 
Ashcroft Court’s assessment of the pre-Ashcroft standard. David Becker, 
a DOJ attorney who litigated Ashcroft, contends that “the pre-Ashcroft 
standard, as first established in Beer, was not nearly as rigid, mechanical 
or simple as some would suggest.”430 Becker and others pointed out that 
the DOJ had always applied an “intensely local appraisal” akin to the 
one that evolved under section 2’s prohibition against vote dilution; that 
Gingles had never “streamlined” the standard to the extent that it 
eliminated the multifactor analysis altogether; and that the DOJ’s own 
guidelines made this explicit.431 As Meghann Donahue points out, 
“Contrary to the common perception that section 5 enforcement under 
Beer was merely a matter of looking at the number of majority-minority 
districts in the proposed plan compared with the benchmark, 
examination of the Department’s past enforcement practices reveals a 
rich history of localized and nuanced review.”432 At any rate, Professor 
 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11 (2006) (testimony of Richard H. Pildes). 
 429. Karlan, supra note 3, at 30–31. 
 430. David J. Becker, Saving Section 5: Reflections on Georgia v. Ashcroft, and Its Impact on the 
Reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act, in Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006, supra note 
4, at 223, 226 (“In reality, neither the courts nor the DOJ have relied upon the simplistic, mechanistic 
approach that some perceive. While remaining true to Beer’s requirement that there can be no 
retrogression in minority voters’ effective exercise of the franchise, as defined by their ability to elect 
candidates of their choice, the DOJ and the lower court in Ashcroft (as well as courts in other cases) 
reviewed massive amounts of evidence, including: expert testimony regarding voting patterns, racially 
polarized voting, and whether certain candidates (regardless of race) were the preferred candidates of 
minority voters; the demographic makeup of districts and the plans as a whole, the success of minority-
preferred candidates in past elections; the approval or disapproval of minority legislators (as 
evidenced by not only their votes, but also their public statements expressed in the legislature and 
otherwise); and the expressed opinions of minority leader, candidates, and voters regarding the 
plans.”). 
 431. Karlan, supra note 3, at 30–31; see also generally Becker, supra note 430. 
 432. Meghann E. Donahue, “The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated”: Administering 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act After Georgia v. Ashcroft, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1651, 1672 (2004). 
Donahue further notes, 
  Analysis of the section 5 administrative review process confirms that the regulations’ call 
to evaluate myriad “complex” facts actually is heeded by Voting Section reviewers. 
Although some commentators have recognized the Department’s increasingly functional 
approach to submissions since the Supreme Court’s sharp rebuke of DOJ practices in the 
1990s, studies of section 5 submissions from the 1980s reveal that jurisdiction-specific review 
has been a mainstay of the DOJ’s section 5 enforcement far longer. For example, the studies 
disclosed situations in which the same changes in different locations received disparate 
treatment by the Voting Section. In Midland, Texas, the Attorney General precleared the 
institution of a majority vote requirement and numbered posts for independent school 
district elections because of an absence of racially polarized voting within the jurisdiction, 
but the Department objected to precisely the same change in Comal, Texas. The 
Department approved an open primary system in Louisiana while objecting to the adoption 
of such a system in Mississippi due to different election patterns in the two states. 
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Bernard Grofman noted that especially after 2000, the DOJ proceeded 
with a “greater caution and functional approach” that “does not seem to 
have been much noticed by legal commentators,” but was “all-pervasive” 
and “apparent.”433 Each “district was evaluated in an intensely local and 
fact-specific appraisal (regarding) whether or not there appeared to be a 
substantively significant change in the likelihood that [the district] would 
elect minority candidates of choice.”434 
Even as they expressed their concern about the increased burden 
that the new standard imposed, those with greater familiarity of the 
administration of preclearance conceded that the new standard could be 
navigated.435 The Ashcroft opinion could indeed be read narrowly as 
reaffirming the VRA’s institutional evolution as a regime that would 
leave electoral design in the hands of local constituencies where possible, 
promote incremental improvement, afford covered jurisdictions 
flexibility to experiment, promote participation and negotiated 
compromise between local minorities and the white majority, and credit 
local knowledge—even as the opinion carves out a narrow exception to 
the pre-Ashcroft retrogression standard. On this reading, the Ashcroft 
retrogression standard has “a presumptive protection for ability-to-elect 
districts, with the qualification that reducing the number of ability-to-
elect districts in an effort to protect legislative leadership positions for 
minority legislators would not be retrogressive if that effort is supported 
by the relevant minority state legislators.”436 In other words, there could 
be situations in which the loss of majority-minority districts still accrued 
to the overall advantage of minorities, precisely in the kind of situation 
with which Ashcroft dealt. Professor David Canon, for example, argued, 
One virtue of Ashcroft was that it allowed that flexibility in the totality 
of circumstances test for retrogression. There is no doubt that the 
representation of racial interests is much stronger in legislatures that 
are controlled by the Democratic party. Trading a few ability-to-elect 
districts for influence districts to maintain majority control would be 
worth it—if the trade could be made with some certainty.437 
Ultimately, Ashcroft’s critics prevailed, and the “ability to elect” 
standard was written into section 5 in the VRARA, thereby prohibiting 
 
Id. at 1473 (footnotes omitted); see also Karlan, supra note 3, at 30–31. 
 433. Grofman & Brunell, supra note 390, at 326. 
 434. Id. at 15. 
 435. Telephone Interview with David Becker, supra note 407. See generally Bernard Grofman, 
Operationalizing the Section 5 Retrogression Standard of the Voting Rights Act in the Light of Georgia 
v. Ashcroft: Social Science Perspectives on Minority Influence, Opportunity and Control, 5 Election 
L.J. 250 (2006). 
 436. David T. Canon, Renewing the Voting Rights Act: Retrogression, Influence, and the “Georgia 
v. Ashcroft Fix”, 7 Election L.J. 3, 24 (2008). 
 437. Id. But see Karlan, supra note 3, at 32–33 (arguing that the possibility of successfully balancing 
such trade-offs was purely theoretical, given all the other political variables). 
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tradeoffs between majority-minority districts (or rather ability-to-elect 
districts) and mere influence districts.438 
IV.  The False Promise of Centralization, Standardization, and 
Bright-Line Rules 
The preceding analysis of section 5 preclearance is brought into 
better relief by contrasting the VRA’s preclearance regime with other 
voting rights laws that have relied on one-size-fits-all, bright-line rules 
with a straightforward mathematical application. This Part briefly 
compares the Supreme Court’s one-person/one-vote rulings, with its 
more recent decision in Bartlett v. Strickland.439 In both instances, the 
Court insisted on imposing “mathematically administrable” bright-line 
rules justified by reference to purportedly self-evident, geometrical 
principles of democracy. 
A. One-Person/One-Vote 
It has frequently been said that bright-line rules are “a key virtue in 
the context of voting rights cases, a context that ‘cries out for any legal 
oversight to take the form of clear, readily-followable rules.’”440 The one-
person/one-vote rule is the classic case in point. Professor Samuel 
Issacharoff has called it “the single most successful remedial effort by the 
Supreme Court in our history.”441 It is widely viewed as a fundamental 
principle of democratic institutions, the Supreme Court’s application of 
which has “solved the problem of grossly malapportioned districts.”442 
Professor Richard Hasen identifies it as the exemplar of a 
“professionalized, centralized, and nonpartisan election administration” 
that is the “hallmark[] of a mature democracy.”443 
 
 438. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization 
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 580–81 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006)). 
 439. 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009). 
 440. Luke McLaughlin, Gingles in Limbo: Coalitional Districts, Party Primaries and Manageable 
Vote Dilution Claims, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 312, 316–17 (2005) (quoting Richard H. Plides, Is Voting 
Rights Law Now at War with Itself?: Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 
1517, 1556 (2002)). 
 441. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 688 
(2006) (testimony of Samuel Issacharoff, Professor, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law). Issacharoff has noted 
that the principle of one-person/one-vote is regarded by many as “so deeply embedded in our culture 
as to seemingly defy any controversy.” Id. It is generally deemed to be “so in keeping with the most 
rudimentary sense of democracy and legitimacy” that any student of the apportionment cases could 
not “fathom that a . . . democratic society could be organized on any other basis.” Id. 
 442. Richard L. Hasen, Election Administration and the New Institutionalism, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 
1075, 1075 (2010) (reviewing Gerken, supra note 28). 
 443. Id. 
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This view, however, is not universally shared among election law 
experts. Even as it promised fair representation and majority rule in the 
face of egregious vote dilution across the country, the rule was highly 
contested and has generated significant controversy.444 Although the one-
person/one-vote rule may well represent the most extraordinary exertion 
of power on the part of the Court, its success has been mixed at best.445 
In Colegrove v. Green, the Supreme Court refused to wade “into the 
political thicket” to reform state legislative districting, calling the issue a 
nonjusticiable political question.446 In Baker v. Carr, the Court reopened 
the issue, suggesting that the “crazy quilt” of legislative districts in 
Tennessee was unconstitutional, because it lacked any justification.447 
When Baker came down several states started reforming their legislative 
redistricting schemes on their own.448 But the Supreme Court was not 
satisfied to prod states into reforming their own systems. Instead it 
announced the equipopulation rule in Gray v. Sanders,449 Reynolds v. 
Sims,450 and Wesberry v. Sanders.451 Reynolds read the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as requiring “equal 
representation” of individuals and imposed the one-person/one-vote rule 
on state apportionment for its legislature. It interpreted that rule—more 
aptly referred to as a principle—as the equipopulation rule: “[A]s a 
federal constitutional requisite both houses of a state legislature must be 
apportioned on a population basis,” meaning that “the Equal Protection 
Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to 
construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal 
population as is practicable.”452 In Wesberry, the Court applied this 
principle to congressional districts.453 In subsequent cases, the Supreme 
 
 444. See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One Person, One Vote, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 
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 450. 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). 
 451. 376 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1964). 
 452. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577. 
 453. Note that the one-person/one-vote rule is just as likely to be interpreted as requiring 
legislative districts with equal numbers of voting age population, the measure the Supreme Court 
adopted for limits on actionable vote dilution under section 2 in Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 
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Court adopted a zero deviation standard for congressional districts, and a 
10% deviation tolerance for state and local electoral districts.454 
The rule unhinged longstanding state and local practices, replacing 
them with a formula that appeared to be a neutral deduction from 
democratic principles by an almost geometric logic. Rather than devise a 
remedy against state and local lock-ups of the political process that could 
be tailored to particular circumstances, the Court legislated a one-size-
fits-all solution. And the subsequent extensions of the rule interpreted 
that solution ever more rigidly and ideologically.455 
The Court’s action seemed intent on rendering the “crazy quilt” of 
congressional, state, and local districts measurable and transparent along 
a dimension that was administrable with “mathematical precision.”456 
Administrability by the federal judiciary was a key reason the Court 
chose the equipopulation rule.457 The rule would trump all other 
districting considerations. Traditional districting criteria, such as 
conforming district lines to the boundaries of political subdivisions, 
maintaining communities of interest, and incorporating considerations of 
natural geography, were subordinated.458 According to Justice Stevens’s 
critical assessment in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of 
Colorado, the one-person/one-vote rulings  
convert[ed] a particular political philosophy into a constitutional rule, 
binding upon each of the 50 States, from Maine to Hawaii, from 
Alaska to Texas, without regard and without respect for the many 
individualized and differentiated characteristics of each State, 
characteristics stemming from each State’s distinct history, distinct 
geography, distinct distribution of population, and distinct political 
heritage.459 
It is instructive to see the Court’s approach in the one-person/one-
vote cases as a high-water mark of a faith in the centralization of 
authority in the federal government.460 The moral authority of the 
Supreme Court and the national government during this period was 
 
1249 (2009). 
 454. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 742 (1983); Toombs v. Fortson, 241 F. Supp. 65, 70 (N.D. 
Ga. 1965) (holding “that a variance of more than 15 percent” for Georgia state legislative districts 
“would be difficult, if not impossible, to justify”). 
 455. Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 692–93 (1989) (abolishing New York City’s Board of 
Estimate on one-person/one vote grounds). 
 456. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18. 
 457. John Hart Ely famously quipped about the rigid demands of one-person/one-vote that 
“administrability is [the doctrine’s] long suit, and the more troublesome question is what else it has to 
recommend it.” John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 121 (1980). 
 458. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 622 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Richard L Engstrom, The 
Supreme Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and 
Effective Representation, 1976 Ariz. St. L.J. 277, 278–79. 
 459. Lucas v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 748 (1964) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 460. See Patterson, supra note 35, at 214; see also Graham, supra note 34, at 179. 
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unquestioned. The faith in the Warren Court’s civil rights jurisprudence 
by liberals was matched, at the time, perhaps only by their faith in 
modern science to address social ills.461 The mathematically precise 
equipopulation rule answered an ideal of surveillability from the 
center.462 In subjecting the states and localities to an equipopulation rule, 
standardization did not merely effect substantial changes, but it did so in 
a manner that made an otherwise unsurveillable thicket of local political 
divisions and distributions of power legible to a centralized federal 
authority.463 The rule reshaped political geography to promote mechanical 
administrability from Washington.464 
Notwithstanding its failure to specify a precise remedy for vote 
dilution, Baker resulted in a nationwide reassessment of state districting 
schemes because it exposed state districting plans to likely constitutional 
challenge. Charles Rhyne, the counsel for appellants in Baker, summed 
up the promise of Baker as follows: 
[I]t is certain that archaic state legislative machinery will now be 
modernized.  
  Genuine state constitutional reform is now possible.  
  The extensive nation-wide dialogue on the fundamentals of our 
system of government provides an opportunity to restudy and 
reallocate public powers and functions to those levels of government 
best able to perform them under twentieth-century conditions.465 
This dialogue about fundamentals, however, was cut short by the 
direction that the Court would take. The Court’s decisions in Sanders, 
Reynolds, and the other one-person/one-vote cases bypassed existing 
state and local political arrangements to directly require every 
jurisdiction throughout the country to reshape its political geography by 
adopting a measure of vote dilution that would rigidly standardize 
districts.466 The Court’s ruling applied nationwide, regardless of whether 
 
 461. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism & 
the Problem of Value 11–12 (1973). 
 462. See Scott, supra note 133, at 4 (“[H]igh-modernist ideology. . . . is best conceived as 
a . . . muscle-bound [] version of the self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, the 
expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including 
human nature), and, above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific 
understanding of natural laws.”). 
 463. See James A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the Possibility of Political Community, 
80 N.C. L. Rev. 1237, 1238–41 (2002) (arguing that the “liberal and nationalizing,” “top-to-bottom 
regime of one person, one vote” served to “flatten and homogenize local identity” by replacing a 
“thicker conception of democracy in which citizens are firmly situated” in a local political community 
with a “thin variety” of democratic politics). 
 464. See id. at 1251. 
 465. Gordon E. Baker, Whatever Happened to the Reapportionment Revolution in the United 
States?, in Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences 257, 261 (Bernard Grofman & 
Arend Lijphart eds., 2003) (quoting Charles Rhyne). 
 466. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (striking down a congressional redistricting plan 
despite a less than one percent population deviation between the largest and smallest districts); 
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it was “congruent and proportional” to an ongoing constitutional 
violation.467 
A perceived virtue of the equipopulation rule was that it could 
apparently be justified on nonpartisan, politically neutral, normative 
grounds. Treating vote dilution as a violation of an individual’s 
fundamental right to equal protection under state and local laws 
translated directly into a geometric principle that could be applied like a 
grid to the electoral map without mediation by a potentially partisan 
process. The equipopulation rule thus promised to render an 
unsurveillable state and local “political thicket” legible and subservient 
to formal, nonpartisan national purposes by eliminating the ability of 
entrenched and partisan local elites to take cover behind confusing local 
institutions and practices. The hope was that political elites would be 
exposed to, and chastened by, the electorate.468 Moreover, the imposition 
of a grid permitted federal courts to readily step in when needed by 
establishing simple, precise, and mathematically demonstrable criteria 
for the constitutional violation. 
The Court had high hopes that its vote dilution standard would give 
“each citizen . . . an equally effective voice in the election of members of 
his state legislature.”469 In fact, the equipopulation principle could 
guarantee no such thing. On its own, it would not necessarily improve the 
rights of individuals to full and fair participation in the political process. 
It would not necessarily eliminate “minority rule.” And it did not 
necessarily improve the situation of racial minority voters in the South.470 
The limitations of the equipopulation rule have been the source of 
much frustration both among scholars and on the bench. Reynolds’s 
framing of vote dilution as an individual right under the Equal Protection 
Clause has limited the possibilities of a more comprehensive institutional 
response.471 Many, including the Supreme Court, have since been looking 
 
Richard L. Hasen, The Benefits of “Judicially Unmanageable” Standards in Election Cases Under the 
Equal Protection Clause, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1469, 1481 (2002) (“[T]he lion’s share of elections even on 
the local level are conducted using the one-person, one-vote standard.”). 
 467. See generally Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 25 (identifying the Supreme Court’s 
incongruent treatments of malapportionment and racial vote dilution under the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
 468. Persily, et al., supra note 445, at 1316. 
 469. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). 
 470. While it increased the voting power of blacks in Atlanta until the legislature adopted new 
rules (including a countywide run-off), it significantly diminished the voting power of blacks in the 
Alabama “black belt” who were beginning to register and vote. McDonald, supra note 444, at 80–103 
(describing the events in Georgia); Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 25, at 39 n.261 (noting that 
Reynolds stripped Alabama’s rural, predominantly black counties of their legislative influence 
virtually on the eve of the massive black enfranchisement brought about by the Voting Rights Act of 
1965). 
 471. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 645 
(2002) (“[T]he current doctrines of individual rights of access and protection against discrimination do 
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for another silver bullet that would supplement the silver bullet that the 
equipopulation rule had promised, but failed, to be.472 Such a response, as 
experts increasingly agree, is exceedingly unlikely.473 
The problem with fixing vote dilution by treating the issue as a 
violation of an individual right under the Equal Protection Clause, as has 
been generally acknowledged to be the case in the literature, is that it 
misunderstands that an individual’s vote is valuable only to the extent 
that her vote is aggregated with the votes of other politically like-minded 
individuals, and is therefore better understood as a right of association 
with a group.474 Minorities in control of the districting process can, in 
theory, crack, pack, and stack even majorities so as to defeat majority 
rule, notwithstanding the equipopulation rule.475 
The Court mandated that redistricting take place every ten years 
based on population changes reflected in the decennial census.476 Insofar 
as districting is left in the hands of the state legislatures in the majority of 
states, legislators are afforded significant opportunity for gerrymanders. 
The equipopulation rule, as already stated, does not preclude line-
drawing that protects incumbents, cracks, packs, and stacks unfriendly 
constituencies, and otherwise distributes political capital according to the 
whims of those who control the line-drawing process. It has been argued 
that by supervening and acting as a constraint on other traditional 
districting criteria—such as maintaining political subdivisions, following 
natural geographical boundaries, and so forth—the equipopulation rule 
facilitates self-interested line drawing.477 Today’s precise computerized 
precinct-by-precinct, block-by-block mapping of political and racial 
demographics, compiled in databases that can be manipulated with the 
help of readily available but sophisticated districting software, makes it 
increasingly likely that election outcomes are already decided before the 
ink on the redistricting plan is dry. The equipopulation rule does little, if 
anything, to curtail such gerrymanders and may, indeed, be partially 
responsible for the ever-increasing number of uncompetitive 
congressional districts resulting from bi-partisan gerrymanders. 
 
not capture the potential risk to the competitive legitimacy of the political process.”). 
 472. See, e.g., Veith v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279–80 (2004). 
 473. Id. at 281 (“As the following discussion reveals, no judicially discernible and manageable 
standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking them, we must 
conclude that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable . . . .”). The one-person/one-vote rule 
was directed at curbing political gerrymandering. A flexible standard, however, would have better 
addressed the issue of political process failure. See Hasen, supra note 466, at 1489–98. 
 474. As Justice Kennedy has recently remarked in Veith, the First Amendment might have opened 
up a more considered approach to the problem. Veith, 541 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see 
also Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 Emory L.J. 869, 884 (1995). 
 475. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein et al., Election Law: Cases and Materials 103–05 (4th 
ed. 2008). 
 476. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583 (1964). 
 477. Engstrom, supra note 458, at 278–79. 
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The equipopulation rule, moreover, did little to improve minority 
vote dilution, notwithstanding its association with other voting rights 
reforms, such as the VRA. Many assume that reapportionment brought 
benefits to black urban communities, because the legislatures became 
more responsive to urban voters. But in Tennessee, as elsewhere in the 
South, the beneficiaries were generally adversaries of black vote 
equalization.478 Those who benefited directly from reapportionment were 
not minorities, but urban and suburban whites.479 Whatever benefits 
blacks achieved through the resulting increase in urban voting strength 
were quickly wiped out in subsequent elections by instituting multi-
member districts.480 
As the Court had recognized in Colegrove v. Green, invalidating a 
state’s districting scheme, and thus potentially moving to a statewide at-
large scheme, could damage minorities by submerging their vote into the 
population at large.481 This was true for Southern urban blacks, who often 
constituted a geographically discrete minority large enough to elect a 
representative from a single-member geographical district.482 Southern 
jurisdictions increasingly shifted to at-large election systems after the 
imposition of the equipopulation rule.483 In at-large systems, of course, 
the one-person/one-vote formula could get no purchase on vote dilution, 
because there were no districts to equalize. Hence jurisdictions could 
avoid the constitutional violation without giving up their ability to keep 
blacks out altogether by districting alone, where, as throughout the South 
(but also nationwide), racial bloc voting prevailed.484 The only way to 
remedy such an evasion was to require electing representatives from 
 
 478. J. Morgan Kousser, Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of 
the Second Reconstruction 165–70 (1999); Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 25, at 18–19 (discussing 
the Court’s failure to address racial vote dilution in Atlanta in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), 
and concluding that “[t]he Court failed . . . to engage in any thorough exploration of the implications 
for racial minorities of the one-person, one-vote rule.”); Douglas Smith, Into the Political Thicket: 
Reapportionment and the Rise of Suburban Power, in The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism 263, 
289 (Matthew D. Lassiter & Joseph Crespino eds., 2010). 
 479. See Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 25, at 2–4; see, e.g., Orville Vernon Burton et al., South 
Carolina, in Quiet Revolution, supra note 4, at 190, 201; McCrary et al., supra note 303, at 38, 47; 
McDonald et al., supra note 303, at 67, 73; Frank R. Parker et al., Mississippi, in Quiet Revolution, 
supra note 4, at 136. 
 480. After Reynolds v. Sims forced the reapportionment of the Alabama statehouse, one black 
representative, the first since reconstruction, was elected to the legislature. Blacksher & Menefee, 
supra note 25, at 2–4. However, at the same time, the clout of the rural “black belt” was effectively 
diminished. Id. 
 481. 328 U.S. 549, 565 (1946). 
 482. See generally Quiet Revolution, supra note 4 (providing statistics).  
 483. See authorities cited supra note 479. 
 484. See Grofman, supra note 435, at 280 (“[N]othing in the discussion in Epstein or O’Halloran 
(or the sources to which they cite) is persuasive about their claim that racially polarized voting in the 
South is now declining.”). See generally Katz et al., supra note 4 (showing that racial bloc voting 
remains a significant problem).  
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single-member districts. Recognizing the harm of vote dilution required 
an altogether different analysis than the one provided by Reynolds. 
There is a large literature on the vicissitudes of the equipopulation 
rule that need not be rehearsed here. The point here is merely to contrast 
the intrusiveness of the one-person/one-vote rule, the merits of which are 
never raised as a constitutional matter, with the flexibility and local 
sensitivity of the VRA’s preclearance regime, which is somehow held to 
a much higher constitutional standard. 
B. BARTLETT V. STRICKLAND: Defining Majority-Minority Districts 
with Mathematical Precision 
In its recent decision in Bartlett v. Strickland,485 the Supreme Court 
appears to have looked for the same type of magic bullet that the one-
person/one-vote rule promised to provide. Questionably relying on an 
abstract principle of majoritarianism (which most district-based elections 
do not espouse),486 the Court defined “majority-minority” districts as 
districts with a 50% or higher minority voting age population.487 The 
superficially appealing rule of Strickland, however, threatens to 
undermine coalition-building and the broader inquiry into minority 
participation that the Ashcroft Court sought to encourage under section 
5. Instead of encouraging incremental change, it threatens to lock 
existing majority-minority districts in place. 
In Strickland, the North Carolina legislature created an additional 
minority opportunity district that crossed Pender County and Hannover 
County lines in the southeast of the state.488 The legislature justified the 
additional district as one mandated by section 2 of the VRA.489 The new 
district was a coalition district with a total black population of 42.9%, a 
BVAP of 39.4%, and a population in which 53.7% of registered 
Democratic voters were black.490 Plaintiffs challenged the new district 
based on a whole-county provision (“WCP”) in the North Carolina 
Constitution, which provides that “no country shall be divided” in the 
formation of state house and senate districts.491 In an earlier decision, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court had held that “any new redistricting 
 
 485. 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009). 
 486. Most U.S. district-based elections are plurality vote, first-past-the-post systems in which the 
winner is the one who gains the most votes, but not necessarily a majority of the votes cast. In the 
United States, Congress and the President are elected this way. So are most state legislatures. See 
Andrew Reynolds et al., Int’l Inst. for Democracy & Electoral Assistance, Election System 
Design: The New International Idea Handbook 31, 32 35, 132, 172 (reprt. 2008) (comparing the 
U.S. system to other national systems). 
 487. 129 S. Ct. at 1244. 
 488. Id. at 1239. 
 489. Id. at 1247. 
 490. Brief for Petitioners at 6, Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (No. 07-689).  
 491. N.C. Const. art. II, §§ 3(3), 5(3). 
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plan[] . . . shall depart from strict compliance with the legal requirements 
set forth herein [including the WCP] only to the extent necessary to 
comply with federal law.”492 The plaintiffs in Strickland claimed that 
section 2 only mandated “majority-minority” districts, defined as districts 
in excess of 50% minority voting age population, and that the new 
district therefore could not be justified in the face of the WCP.493 
Construing the amended section 2 in Gingles, the U.S. Supreme 
Court had identified three “necessary preconditions” for a claim that a 
use of multimember districts constitutes actionable vote dilution.494 
Under Gingles, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the minority group “is 
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a de facto 
majority in a single-member district,” (2) that the minority group is 
“politically cohesive,” and (3) that “the white majority votes sufficiently 
as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred 
candidate.495 Only when a party has established these requirements496 
does a Court go on to analyze whether a section 2 violation has occurred 
based on the totality of circumstances.497 Following precedent, the North 
Carolina panel that heard the Strickland case explained that “the first 
Gingles precondition ‘depends on the political realities extant in the 
particular district in question, not just the raw numbers of black voters 
present in the general population of the district.’”498 The critical question, 
according to the panel, was whether minority voters form “a de facto 
majority that can elect candidates of their choosing,” considering the 
totality of circumstances and not “sheer numbers alone.”499 Citing 
Ashcroft, the state panel  
described the challenged District 18 as an “ability to elect” or 
“coalition” district in which African-American voters “are able to form 
coalitions with voters from other racial and ethnic groups, having no 
need to be a majority within a single district in order to elect 
candidates of their own choice.”500 
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 2 
claims require a threshold showing that the minority group “is 
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single-member district”—a requirement that, as a matter of law, could 
 
 492. Stephenson v. Bartlett, 582 S.E.2d 247, 250–51 (N.C. 2003) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 397 (N.C. 2002)). 
 493. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 490, at 16–20. 
 494. It later held that those requirements applied equally to section 2 cases involving single 
member districts. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993). 
 495. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986). 
 496. Id. 
 497. See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013 (1994). 
 498. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 490, at 10 (quoting state court panel).  
 499. Id. (quoting state court panel) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 500. Id. at 11 (quoting state court panel) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Halberstam-62-HLJ-923 (Do Not Delete) 4/28/2011 12:21 PM 
996 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:923 
not be met by districts with a minority voting age population below 
50%.501 The North Carolina Supreme Court also held that the 
appropriate measure of population was the “minority voting age 
population.”502 Neither issue had been previously settled. 
In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, a majority of the Justices 
on the U.S. Supreme Court agreed. Only minority opportunity districts 
with a 50% or greater black voting age population are mandated by 
section 2.503 Mandatory recognition of crossover claims, the Court 
reasoned, would create serious tension with the third Gingles 
requirement: To the extent that minorities could rely on white crossover 
voting in the district, the majority was not voting as a bloc to defeat the 
minority preferred candidate.504 
In oral argument, petitioners had urgently invoked Justice 
O’Connor’s vision that “[t]he Voting Rights Act should be interpreted in 
such a way as to encourage a transition to a society where race no longer 
matters.”505 Coalition districts, they argued, were “crucial” in promoting 
this goal: 
Coalition districts bring races together by fostering political alliances 
across racial lines. As a result they serve to diminish racial polarization 
over time. Coalition districts help us in reaching the point where race 
will no longer matter in drawing district lines. These districts bring us 
one step closer to fulfilling our Nation’s moral and ethical obligation to 
create an integrated society.506 
The majority, however, rejected this reasoning. The majority argued 
that “[r]ecognizing a § 2 claim where minority voters cannot elect their 
candidate of choice based on their own votes and without assistance from 
others would grant special protection to their right to form political 
coalitions that is not authorized by the section.”507 According to the 
Court, the 50% rule drew a “clear line” that served the need for 
“workable standards for sound judicial and legislative administration.”508 
Like the one-person/one-vote rule, the 50% rule constituted: 
[A]n objective, numerical test . . . [that was n]ot an arbitrary 
invention . . . [but] has its foundation in principles of democratic 
governance. The special significance in the democratic process, of a 
majority, means it is a special wrong when a minority group has 50 
percent or more of the voting population and could constitute a 
 
 501. Pender Cnty. v. Bartlett, 649 S.E.2d 364, 370, 372 (N.C. 2007). 
 502. Id. at 374. 
 503. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1244 (2009). 
 504. Id. 
 505. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (No. 07-689). 
 506. Id. 
 507. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. at 1237. 
 508. Id. at 1244. 
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compact voting majority but, despite racially polarized bloc voting, that 
group is not put into a district.509 
Whereas the Ashcroft Court had urged that simple math and bright-
line rules be abandoned as measures for vote dilution under section 5, 
Strickland insists that judicial manageability and the algebra of 
democracy compel that minority voting age population in an ability-to-
elect district must exceed 50% of the population in that district. Whereas 
Ashcroft held that coalition districts and influence districts could, under 
appropriate circumstances, satisfy federal requirements under section 5, 
Strickland now holds that neither can serve as a remedy for minority vote 
dilution claims under the Constitution, regardless of state or local 
circumstances. In so ruling, the Strickland Court undercut Ashcroft’s 
vision of political progress through the gradual integration that appears, 
more generally, to have animated Justice O’Connor’s voting rights 
decisions. 
The rationale behind the 50% rule in Strickland represents a 
significant departure from vote dilution principles. As Justice Souter 
pointed out in his dissent, the number of minority seats in the legislature 
and the other senate factors should guide the appropriate vote dilution 
analysis, including a history of government-sponsored racial 
discrimination.510 It makes no sense to focus on “equal opportunity” in 
the particular remedial district. 
Moreover, Strickland further complicates the relationship between 
section 5 and section 2. In the past, as in Ashcroft, for example, the DOJ 
carefully scrutinized population reductions in minority opportunity 
districts. But it has neither relied solely on BVAP, nor has it objected to 
reductions below 50% BVAP in every case. The Attorney General has 
not objected to even massive reductions in minority voting age 
populations in majority-minority districts, so long as a minority candidate 
in the district could rely on sufficient cross-over voting.511 Under 
Strickland, it now appears that crossover or coalition districts are no 
longer protected as ability-to-elect districts. If the Court’s definition of 
“ability to elect” districts under section 2 also applies to ability-to-elect 
districts under the new section 5, then it would seem to follow that 
section 5 also no longer protects coalition districts. In other words, the 
DOJ cannot object to the elimination of coalition districts under the 
 
 509. Id. at 1245. 
 510. Id. at 1251 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 511. For example, in the state senate districting plan at issue in Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Attorney 
General did not object to Senate District No. 22, which “has a total black population of 54.71%. The 
proposed Senate District 22 would experience a decrease in BVAP from 63.51% (Ga.) or 62.65% 
(U.S.), to 51.15% (Ga.) or 50.76% (U.S.). The percentage of black registered voters would also fall 
from 64.07% to 49.44%.” 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 63 (D.D.C. 2002) (citations omitted), vacated, 539 U.S. 
461, 472–73 (2003). 
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retrogression standard, if coalition districts no longer count as protected 
minority opportunity districts. Either the DOJ must now insist on 
packing minorities into 50%-plus BVAP districts, even in instances 
where this is entirely unnecessary, or risk losing those districts forever. 
Strickland thereby threatens to reverse the trend of gradual reductions in 
minority voting age population that the Supreme Court had previously 
welcomed. Instead of empowering state and local jurisdictions to adopt 
“best practices” and to unpack majority-minority districts as much as 
possible, depending on local conditions, Strickland now requires 
adherence to a rigid 50% rule, giving jurisdictions no choice in the 
matter. Unlike NAMUDNO, which interpreted the coverage provision to 
grant local jurisdictions the autonomy to bail out from under section 5, 
thereby encouraging the adoption of best practices, Strickland insists on 
uniformity and locks majority-minority districts in place. 
Conclusion 
Decentralization has frequently been invoked as a justification for 
our constitutional federalism. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, for example, 
Justice O’Connor wrote that:  
  Th[e] federalist structure . . . . assures a decentralized government 
that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous 
society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic 
processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in 
government; and it makes government more responsive by putting 
States in competition for a mobile citizenry.512  
Others have similarly justified federalism in terms of the democratic and 
pragmatic benefits of state and local autonomy.513 If we credit this 
functional, substantive account of constitutional federalism, the scope 
and extent of section 5’s actual interference with state and local decision 
making matters greatly in assessing the “federalism costs” of the 
preclearance regime. 
Part I described the conventional view of section 5 preclearance as a 
“nationalization” of governmental authority over state and local election 
laws. This view suggests the imposition of uniform minimum standards 
below which no experimentation is permitted. The one-person/one-vote 
rule is exemplary in this respect. It is a one-size-fits-all rule that tolerates 
no variation.514 Conservative critics of the VRA claim that section 5 
 
 512. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). 
 513. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 141, at 27 (describing federalism as “constitutionally mandated 
decentralization” that promotes local preferences); Cariello, supra note 141, at 1558–69 (arguing that 
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Supreme Court adopt a functional approach to federalism); McGinnis, supra note 141, at 526 
(“[F]ederalism . . . was the Framers’ most important contribution to protecting decentralized 
traditionmaking.”). 
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preclearance is even more intrusive. A leading opponent of affirmative 
action, who held senior positions under Presidents Reagan and Bush in 
the CRD deplores that “Section 5 prohibits more state voting practices 
than those necessarily encompassed by the explicit prohibition on 
intentional discrimination found in the text of the Fifteenth 
Amendment.”515 
But as we have shown in Part III, section 5 has, in many respects, 
been far more permissive than the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, both of which also apply. The institutional architecture of 
section 5 preclearance did not require strict compliance with uniform 
minimum constitutional standards. Only new laws must be precleared. 
Laws that were not changed were not subject to preclearance. The DOJ’s 
initial implementation during the 1970s and 1980s, furthermore, did not 
require strict compliance for new laws either, but took a pragmatic 
approach that aimed at workable incremental improvements. The 
Supreme Court’s decision in City of Richmond516 institutionalized this 
approach by approving a compromise that fell short of the disparate 
impact provision in the preclearance standard. In Beer, the Supreme 
Court further insisted that preclearance could only be denied in cases of 
retrogression or “backsliding.”517 In other words, a pure discriminatory 
effects standard was never applied. The DOJ typically relied on 
discriminatory intent after Beer, and when it did apply retrogressive 
effect, it was usually in combination with discriminatory intent or other 
standards articulated by the federal courts.518 Unlike the equipopulation 
rule, preclearance did not require covered jurisdictions to adopt a 
particular election design and did not apply to existing laws. It required 
decisionmakers to take changing national antidiscrimination standards 
into account. As these standards evolved in the courts, the DOJ’s 
standards of review evolved as well. But, as has been shown in the 
examination of the different phases of implementation, the DOJ’s 
preclearance standard has always remained more permissive. Moreover, 
the Supreme Court increasingly narrowed the discretion of the DOJ to 
push for any improvement in racial vote discrimination, prohibiting the 
 
standards for congressional districts, but the rule is nationally uniform. Hasen, supra note 466, at 1480–
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Supreme Court Review 2008–2009, at 35, 46 (Ilya Shapiro ed., 2009) (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. 
Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2523 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation 
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 517. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1975). 
 518. See Posner, supra note 168, at 98–99. 
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DOJ from applying even the undisputed constitutional intent standard.519 
The VRARA restored the constitutional intent standard, but the Shaw 
decisions, precluding redistricting efforts from relying “predominantly” on 
race, still restrict the DOJ’s discretion. 
Given the continuing hyper-decentralization of election law and 
administration, it would be disingenuous of critics to suggest that 
preclearance has undermined state and local participation in 
decisionmaking. The preclearance regime has not displaced 
decisionmakers, nor diminished local participation in the process. To the 
contrary, the very design of the administrative preclearance process has 
encouraged increased levels of local participation and deliberation by 
requiring submissions to include evidence of public notice, comment, and 
participation of those affected by election law changes. It has required 
decisionmakers to take antidiscrimination standards into account. But that 
was an obligation they had under the Constitution anyhow—whether or 
not they were covered by Section 5. Section 5 certainly has encouraged 
jurisdictions to integrate those standards into their decisionmaking 
procedures. Moreover, preclearance has enforced antidiscrimination with 
a minimum of litigation, primarily by requiring jurisdictions to publicize 
information standardized to permit an assessment of discriminatory impact 
or intent. The production of information to the DOJ and minority groups 
has enabled negotiations among affected interests and has educated local 
decisionmakers about the application of antidiscrimination standards in 
their decisionmaking. It has also put local jurisdictions in direct dialogue 
with the DOJ. 
The ratio of objections to submissions was highest when preclearance 
first became mandatory, and declined dramatically as submissions 
increased and antidiscrimination standards became well established. This 
means that the relative burden on jurisdictions significantly declined as 
conditions improved. With less than 1% of submissions drawing objections 
in the 1990s, and many fewer objections interposed during the period from 
2000 to 2006, the burden in all but the rarest of cases has involved 
producing the information relating to new election laws to the DOJ and 
the public. Even if the DOJ lodged an objection, preclearance was still 
much less burdensome than litigation, much faster, much less costly, much 
less adversarial, and permitted a much speedier resolution. 
The NAMUDNO Court signaled that it would revisit the 
constitutionality of preclearance, but did not resolve what standard would 
apply.520 Under the more stringent standard that the Supreme Court 
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articulated in City of Boerne v. Flores, Congress’s enforcement powers 
under the Civil War Amendments are limited to legislating a “congruent 
and proportional” remedy to an ongoing constitutional violation.521 
Part III also showed that preclearance has functioned for the most 
part as a learning/monitoring regime that, in over 99% of all cases, has 
simply required the production of information. In those rare cases in which 
an objection has been lodged, the DOJ’s concerns usually could be 
satisfied by limited changes to the jurisdiction’s chosen election design. 
The showing that preclearance is not nearly as invasive as suggested 
counters arguments that the VRA’s federalism costs are 
“disproportionate.” It detracts considerably from the conventional, 
heretofore unchallenged, claim that the VRA’s federalism costs should 
weigh heavily in the constitutional balance. It is, moreover, important to 
understand the success of the VRA in institutionalizing a national 
antidiscrimination policy as being closely linked to its relative tolerance of 
local decisionmaking, its encouragement of transparency and dialogue at 
the local level about acceptable governance of electoral design and 
administration, and the broader local participation in the political process 
that it has fostered—without cutting previously existing powerful 
constituencies out of these negotiations, but engaging them. These insights 
should be helpful in the current debate about how the preclearance 
regime, and the VRA as a whole, should be modified to reflect historical 
developments—including, for example, the transformation of election 
administration at the state and local levels due to the impact of 
technological innovation. Key issues that will have to be addressed are the 
coverage provision and the Ashcroft fix. Both issues have been the subject 
of ongoing debate and are beyond the immediate scope of this Article. 
Section 5 preclearance exemplifies an approach to social and political 
change that has received attention in the legal literature by so-called “new 
institutionalists.” New institutional economists have shown the way here. 
New institutionalists share the recognition that “institutions” are practices 
of informal and formal social orderings. Formal legal rules and 
standards—namely, governments—shape institutions, but are significantly 
constrained and shaped by existing structures and their path-dependent 
processes of evolution.522 Institutions embody power relations and 
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arrangements between individuals and groups but, importantly, also 
embody social techniques and learning. My own emphasis here is on the 
persistence and structure of institutional change, which is not something to 
be contended with only occasionally, but is the context in which all 
policymaking takes place. In addition to the constitutional implications set 
forth above, this examination of section 5 preclearance serves as a case 
study in this larger theoretical inquiry. 
Even stable institutions must evolve in response to social and 
demographic changes. New social groups emerge and pursue institutional 
changes to promote their own interests. As reformers, we want to 
progress existing social structures to promote rights, welfare, or more 
particular values. Sophisticated reformers all recognize that institutional 
change produces dislocation of existing practices, but the focus is all too 
often on innovation and progress. A natural blind spot is the failure 
sufficiently to recognize not merely the disruption of existing practices, 
but that all change involves intervention into complex ecosystems, 
inevitably causing unintended consequences. Existing practices and 
routines embody particular techniques, experiences, and knowledge sets 
acquired and passed on by local actors and groups. Institutional change 
compromises those power positions—often intentionally so. But it also 
threatens the disruption, displacement, or loss of the techniques and 
knowledge sets that underwrite contested practices. Local knowledge 
connected with contested practices, however, may produce positive 
externalities or spillovers in areas that are not targeted for reform, or in 
practices related to reform efforts that must nonetheless be preserved or 
fostered for reform to succeed. In the area of civil rights, the emphasis 
has understandably often been on the elimination of violations. What the 
success of section 5 shows, however, is that civil rights efforts answer to 
the more general dynamics of institutional change. 
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